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Firms increasingly disaggregate business processes and source them on a global 
basis, either intra-firm or from external vendors. This dissertation examines two relevant 
strategic choices for business process sourcing: the choice of sourcing mechanisms and 
the choice of contract types. First a comprehensive choice model is proposed to 
incorporate different perspectives of transaction cost economics (TCE), resource-based 
view (RBV) and modular systems theory for the choice of sourcing mechanisms. The 
results indicate that modular design characteristics such as modularity and IT 
detachability of business processes have significant impact on firms’ sourcing choices. 
The findings show that at higher level of process modularity, domestic outsourcing is 
more likely while offshore outsourcing is more preferred at lower level of process 
modularity. Also domestic outsourcing is preferred over offshore outsourcing when 
processes are tightly coupled with the IT infrastructure. The results suggest that offshore 
outsourcing is a different governance mode from domestic outsourcing. It may be a 
viable choice for firms that are looking for capabilities and adaptation willingness to 
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improve the modular design of a process and to meet firm-specific needs, but the non-
modular design of IT infrastructure may inhibit such attempts. 
The dissertation then examined how firms select appropriate types of contract 
once outsourcing decisions are made. Three types of contracts were considered: Fixed-
price (FP), Cost-plus (CP) and Time & Materials (T&M), which provide different levels 
of cost-reduction incentive, completeness of contract design and flexibility to change. 
The findings suggest that business characteristics impact coordination and negotiation 
costs and thus the choice of contract types. Higher coordination costs (the costs of 
managing interdependence) lead to higher probability of selecting contracts with high 
incentives and detailed service descriptions such as FP contracts while high negotiation 
costs (the costs of opportunistic behavior in ex post adaptation) increase firms’ preference 
to contracts with more flexibility to change such as T&M contracts. Further, the selection 
bias of the choice of sourcing mechanism on the choice of contract types was identified. 
Firms that select outsourcing are more likely to adopt contracts with high level of 
incentive and contract completeness.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
There is an increasing trend of business process global sourcing. Firms 
increasingly disaggregate business processes and source them on a global basis, either 
intra-firm or from external vendors. According to Gartner, Inc., worldwide business 
process outsourcing (BPO) services reach the market size of 173 billion for 2007, among 
which offshoring accounts for 24.2 billion, or about 15%. 
Different from conventional sourcing problems, the target processes of the current 
trend are generally service oriented, human capital and knowledge intensive, e.g. human 
resource, financial and accounting or customer service processes. It is difficult to define 
the boundary of a business process and detach it from organization structure. First, 
precisely measuring the outputs and performance of service processes is difficult (e.g. 
Noyelle 1990; Brynjolfsson 1993). Intangible performance indicators such as quality, 
variety or responsiveness can hardly be suppressed into productivity or other statistics. 
Thus firms have extra burden to devise approaches to avoid losing track of the 
performance, inefficient control or being engaged in frictions when unbundling such 
business activities. Second, business processes delineate the context where knowledge 
originates from unique experiences and organizational learning by the employees 
(Davenport and Prusak 1998). Although some knowledge may reside in organizational 
systems, processes, rules and routines (De Long and Fahey 2000), a large part of 
knowledge is manifested in skills and experiential knowledge of individual employees. 
The tacitness of knowledge requires the management being aware of learning and 
coordination problems when sourcing the business processes from outside. Such 
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complexity associated with business processes needs more complete analysis of sourcing 
strategies down to the process level.  
The complexity and heterogeneity of firms’ business process sourcing strategies 
have been observed. First is the heterogeneity of the choice of sourcing mechanisms for 
business processes. Different firms choose different sourcing mechanisms for similar 
business processes. For example, for call center operations, Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. still 
uses internal staff, Procter & Gamble outsources to IBM, Hewlett-Packard establishes an 
offshore captive center, and Prudential uses an Indian vendor. Firms implement different 
sourcing mechanisms for business processes even if the processes are within the same 
functional department. For instance, ABN AMRO recently outsourced its IT 
infrastructure to IBM (i.e. domestic outsourcing) and IT application support and 
enhancement to two Indian companies, Infosys and Tata Consultancy Services (i.e. 
offshore outsourcing), while still kept 1,800 IT staff in-house (i.e. domestic insourcing). 
Thus, firms have a choice among four major sourcing mechanisms: (a) domestic 
insourcing: make it in-house at a domestic site of the firm; (b) offshore insourcing: make 
it in-house at an offshore subsidiary of the firm; (c) domestic outsourcing: buy it from a 
domestic vendor; (d) offshore outsourcing: buy it from an offshore vendor (Konana et al. 
2004). Although much has been known about how firms choose outsourcing for business 
activities such as manufacturing (e.g. Monteverde and Teece 1982), sales force (e.g. 
Anderson and Schmittlein 1984), or information systems (e.g. Ang and Straub 1998; 
Nam et al. 1996) based on characteristics of the activities, we have limited understanding 
of sourcing decisions at the level of business processes and in the context that goes 
beyond binary in- vs. out-sourcing choices. 
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Second, as outsourcing becomes inevitable, it is also important to consider firms’ 
decisions and strategies ex post the choice of sourcing mechanisms. Selecting appropriate 
contract structure is one of the major decisions firms have to make once they approach 
for outsourcing (Gartner 2007). An appropriate contract is critical for the success of 
business process outsourcing. The firm relies on the formal contract to monitor or 
coordinate with the vendor. Reputation or long-term relationship cannot eliminate the 
necessity of a formal contract. A contract works as a major incentive and monitoring 
instrument for the relationship between the client and the vendor. Although it is not 
possible to prescribe remedies for all the contingencies and to completely prevent 
renegotiation, a carefully-drafted contract is still crucial for the outsourcing relationship 
to work out. Firms should select a contract structure that minimizes the risks of ex ante 
information asymmetry (i.e. the vendor knows better about the costs of the project and his 
effort is not observable to the client) problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard 
and ex post adaptation costs when unexpected changes happen.  
There are three main types of contract: fixed price, time and materials and cost-
plus (hybrid). In a world of perfect complete information, the client can describe what he 
wants perfectly and the vendor can understand perfectly and thus a simple contract that 
gives a price for the product/service described should be enough to guide the relationship 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2000). However, in real world, it is very costly, if not impossible for 
the client to describe and the vendor to understand the object to be delivered ex ante. 
Thus changes may happen and there will be overrun to adapt to the changes. The three 
contract types are differentiated in their ways to deal with overrun that cannot be 
specified in contract ex ante. Fixed price (FP) contracts pay a fixed fee (P) and the 
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vendor bears all overrun if there is any. Such arrangement put technological and financial 
risks on the vendor if there are unexpected changes. Time and materials (T&M) contracts 
work the other way around: the risks are on the client because they pay for all overrun 
(P+O). Cost-plus (CP) falls in between FP and T&M contracts as the client and the 
vendor share overrun and thus risks ( ). Sharing of risks can also be 
realized in a way that the client gives an award in addition to share of the cost as the 
project finishes. Thus FP and T&M are extreme cases of CP when and , 
respectively. Therefore there is a continuum of contract types as  goes from 0 to 1, the 
higher the , the lower the incentive for vendors to save costs. The choice of contract 
types is to match the features of the contract and the characteristics of the transaction (the 
business process per se).  
The dissertation tends to address the choice of sourcing mechanisms and the 
choice of contract types. We identified the characteristics that define a business process 
and examined their effects on the two strategic choices. There is inherent link between 
the two choices since both choices aim to minimize coordination and transaction costs of 
sourcing a business process. Bajari and Tadelis (2001) made a connection between their 
analysis of contract choices and the TCE-based analysis of sourcing choices. Since the 
concerns of selecting sourcing mechanisms are similar to concerns of selecting contract 
types (Williamson 2002), factors that affect the choice of sourcing mechanisms will have 
impact on contract choices. However, we are yet to know how the choice of sourcing 
mechanisms impacts the choice of contract types. 
For the choice of sourcing mechanisms, we proposed a comprehensive model that 
incorporates three different perspectives that are often used to examine firms’ governance 
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choices while focusing on the new modular systems perspective that has yet to be 
developed. The first perspective is the dominant transaction cost economics (TCE) 
perspective (e.g. Williamson 1975, 1985). It views the firm as a nexus of transactions. 
Whether a transaction should be sourced from the market (outsourcing) is associated with 
the potential transaction costs that may be generated in the outsourcing relationship. The 
vast body of the literature in this stream has identified characteristics that may lead to 
high level of transaction costs and thus impact the governance choice. The second stream 
is resource-based view (RBV) (Barney 1991; Kogut and Zander 1992). Researchers in 
this school take a strategic perspective rather than a cost perspective. They view the firm 
as a bundle of resources. Resources that are developed from the social and historical 
context and embodied with specific tacit and valuable knowledge of the firm are 
strategically important and should not be disaggregated out of the organizational context 
of the firm. The third view, modular systems views the firm as a system of components 
that interact with each other to achieve certain organizational goals (e.g. Baldwin and 
Clark 2000; Sanchez and Mahoney 1996; Schilling and Steensma 2001). If the design of 
the system is modular, i.e. components are encapsulated with well-defined interfaces and 
performance specifications, the firm has the flexibility to disaggregate and recombine the 
components to achieve maximum benefits without much loss of functionality. Baldwin 
and Clark (2006) was trying to establish a theory of firm based on the modular design 
view, arguing that transactions should happen at the thin interfaces between components 
and each component, the firm, encapsulates thick coordination and information inside it.  
We examined why and how characteristics, especially modular design 
characteristics of business processes affect the choice of sourcing mechanisms for 
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business processes. We developed two modular design characteristics: process 
modularity and the detachability of the process from IT infrastructure. Differences in the 
levels of process modularity and IT detachability have different implications on 
production, coordination and transaction costs across different sourcing mechanisms 
(Tanriverdi et al. 2007). We adopt the cost analysis framework of TCE to understand how 
these costs influence the choice of sourcing mechanisms. 
We seek to make contributions to the literature on the choice of sourcing 
mechanisms. First, it is among the first studies to conceptually link process characteristics 
to the choice of business process sourcing mechanisms. The knowledge gained from this 
study can be used by practitioners in evaluating business processes during alternative 
sourcing considerations. Second, we systematically examined the impact of business 
process characteristics suggested in three streams of literature. Especially we adapted 
modular systems theory to analyze business process sourcing problems. Finally, we 
developed and validated two modular design constructs—process modularity and IT 
detachability—which could potentially enable IS and organizational research to better 
understand how business and IT architectures can be designed to increase firms’ global 
sourcing capabilities. 
For the choice of contract types, we investigated how business characteristics 
affect coordination and negotiations costs and thus the choice of contract types. We 
analyzed the impact of ex post coordination and negotiation costs of a transaction on the 
choice of contract types instead of ex ante information asymmetry and moral hazards. 
Our contributions are twofold. First we established the link between business 
characteristics and the choice of contract types through coordination and negotiation 
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costs. The choice of contract type is to match the incentive and negotiation cost features 
of the contract to the characteristics of the transaction. A two-stage model clarifies the 
antecedents and the impact on the contract choice of coordination and negotiation costs. 
We found the two types of costs are associated with different business process 
characteristics and have differentiated impact on the choice of contract types. Together 
the model confirms the implicit theoretical link between characteristics and contract 
choices in the context of business process sourcing. Second, we considered the selection 
bias of the choice of sourcing mechanisms on the choice of contract types. Contract 
choices can only be observed after the firm chooses to outsource. For those firms that do 
not go for outsourcing, their concerns of transaction costs exceed the benefits of 
outsourcing. They can be viewed as selecting a contract type that is even more extreme 
than T&M with hierarchical administration and authority to avoid renegotiation haggling. 
Additionally the two choices may not be independent. Different choices of sourcing 
mechanisms may affect their preference to contract types. For instance, firms that choose 
domestic outsourcing may intentionally use more fixed price contracts. Thus leaving out 
the choice of sourcing mechanisms out of the analysis of contract choices will cause 
biases in the results. We adopt a method to account for the selection bias of the choice of 
sourcing mechanism on contract choices.  
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives a detailed 
review of the literature on the choice of sourcing mechanisms and the choice of contract 
types. Chapter 3 develops business process characteristics. Chapter 4 provides the 
theoretical and hypotheses development for the choice of sourcing mechanisms. Chapter 
5 discusses and hypothesizes about the choice of contract types. Chapter 6 presents 
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details of the empirical study and findings. Chapter 7 concludes the paper with a 
discussion of the implications, limitations, and future research. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1. LITERATURE ON THE CHOICE OF SOURCING MECHANISMS 
The choice of sourcing mechanisms is in nature the question of how to organize 
business activities in different governance modes. There is an enormous body of 
literature studying governance choices of business activities. The theoretical foundation 
can be summarized in two themes: transaction cost economics (TCE) and resource-based 
view (RBV) of the firm. They take different views of the firm (integration, insourcing) as 
a governance choice. Consequently different determinants of governance choices are 
derived.  
TCE views the firm as a collection of transactions, whether the firm should keep a 
transaction inside depends on the potential transaction costs may be generated from 
market arrangements. The fundamental logic of TCE is based on Coase’s insight that the 
firm is a different mode of organizing business activities from the market. The market is 
assumed to be more efficient than the firm because of the efficiency of free markets 
(Demsetz 1991; Pisano 1990). However, there are costs associated with market 
transactions, including the explicit costs of writing and enforcing a contract and the 
efficiency loss due to ex post opportunistic behavior and frictions between the parties 
(Tirole 1999; Williamson 1985). Then the comparison that matters is between the 
transaction costs of procuring from the market and of managing it in-house 
(administrative, bureaucratic costs, etc.). As Williamson (1996: p26) described: 
“Markets, both currently and prospectively, can then be presumed to work well. The 
really interesting problems of managing transactions across successive stages of 
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production show up when bilateral dependency conditions appear.” When the costs 
exceed the benefits of market efficiency, the firm may be the better choice to coordinate 
business activities.  
Williamson (1979, 1985) extended Coase’s TCE argument by identifying causes 
of transaction costs. His theory made Coase’s TCE argument operationalizable and 
derived testable implications of TCE. He examined the microanalytic factors that 
characterize a transaction and lead to different transaction costs and clarified governance 
modes about their differences in managing transaction costs. For instance, the firm is 
better to coordinate transactions with potentially high transaction costs. By matching 
transactions with certain characteristics with appropriate governance mode, his analysis 
answers the question “which transactions would be organized by which mode of 
organization and why”. According to him, the two major factors are asset specificity, 
which raises the prospect of opportunism, and uncertainty, which intensifies the problem 
of incomplete contract. In general, the firm is preferred when high level of asset 
specificity and uncertainty is involved in the transaction. 
Asset specificity reduces firms’ freedom to detach a business activity and farm it 
out. The presence of asset specificity resembles sunk physical and human investments 
that are specific to the transaction. Such specific assets can hardly be redeployed outside 
the current contractual relationship. The firm’s ability to shift to potential vendors in the 
competitive market is diminished so that the firm becomes vulnerable to the vendor’s 
opportunistic behavior, or in other words, “hold-up” by the vendor (Williamson 1985, 
Klein et al. 1978). For example, if the firm has trained the vendor with its specific 
procedure or tuned the process towards the vendor’s capability, the vendor may bargain 
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for a better price because now it can threaten to leave the client. It will be very difficult 
for the client to recapture the value of the sunk investment since it is specialized to the 
relationship. The firm, on the other hand, has the authority and fiat to avoid such risks. 
Thus the firm, i.e. keeping in-house turns out to be a better governance mechanism than 
arm-length relationships.  
Uncertainty associated with the transaction leads to transaction costs from crafting 
the contract and maladaptation ex post. High uncertainty makes it difficult to predict 
future contingencies and engages the parties into frequent ex post adaptation. As it is 
impossible to specify all the contingencies ex ante in the formal contract, uncertainties 
lead to costly “haggling and friction” between the parties, therefore transaction costs. 
Even when the situations are not serious enough to renegotiate with the vendor, the daily 
service delivery under high uncertainty will still incur high coordination costs. When the 
firm itself cannot fully understand and efficiently execute the process, the vendor has to 
resort to intensive communication and information searching for problems and thus slow 
down the exception-response-execution process. All these result in high transaction costs 
that offset the benefits of outsourcing. Thus it is a better choice to keep transactions 
involving high uncertainty in-house than to use outside vendors. 
The vast empirical literature afterwards operationalizes these microanalytic 
factors of a transaction and investigates how these factors affect various governance 
choices for a variety of business activities. Monteverde and Teece (1982) and Walker and 
Weber (1984) studied the sourcing of components in automobile manufacturing. Their 
results verified that asset specificity, uncertainty and other factors that raised concerns of 
vendor opportunism made the firm reluctant to outsource components. Moreover, 
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W1alker and Weber (1984) explicitly included the production cost advantage of 
outsourcing in the analysis of the effect of transaction costs, which strengthen the 
explanatory power of transaction costs for firms’ governance choice. Anderson and 
Schimittlein (1984) studied firms’ choice between outside and internal sales force and 
thus extended the analysis to human capital based business activities and similarly 
supported the effect of the transaction level factors such as asset specificity and 
uncertainty. Pisano (1990)’s work on research and development (R&D) shows that the 
scope of business activities for outsourcing has been extended to strategic functions. IS 
research has applied TCE to the phenomenon of Information Systems outsourcing and 
reached similar conclusions. Nam et al. (1996) found that asset specificity, uncertainty 
and other TCE factors affected firms’ extent of outsourcing IS function.  Ang and Straub 
(1998) argued that both production cost and transaction cost need to be taken into 
consideration for firms’ sourcing decision. While neoclassical economics predicts that 
firms making sourcing decisions based on production economies, TCE suggests that 
transaction costs originated from market exchange may erode the production cost 
savings. In summary, findings generally confirmed Williamson’s theory and showed that 
it provides a powerful theoretical foundation to study the firms’ governance choices even 
at different levels of analysis (see Table 11).  
Researchers in the RBV school went beyond the cost minimization perspective 
and views the firm as a collection of resources. Valuable resources are often tacit and 
specific, otherwise it is easy for competitors to replicate or imitate. These resources are 
                                                 
1 Boerner and Macher (2001) and Rincfleisch and Heide (1997) have given comprehensive review of TCE-
based literature on firms’ governance choices. 
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critical to a firm to maintain its competitive advantages and survive competition. The 
firm is superior to market as a mechanism for creating and sustaining such resources 
(Barney 1991). First, resources often evolve through a unique path that is associated with 
the firm’s history. It might be hard to decouple those processes from the firm’s historical 
and social fabric and other tangible or intangible organization resources. It may be 
embodied with tacit knowledge, organizational memory and other intellectual assets that 
a firm does not want competitors to imitate. The tacitness and social complexity of such 
resource make resources difficult to create or transfer without tight integration.  Contract-
based arm-length relationships cannot establish the same trust and psychological link as 
within the firm (Kogut and Zander 1992). Second, the firm also provides superior 
coordinative attributes, information processing abilities and knowledge protection 
capabilities (Gulati and Singh 1998) to the market. Third, the resources need time and 
investments to develop over a long period. The firm will have stronger incentive to 
secure and nurture the relevant investments. Thus when a business activity is such a 
critical resource, the firm should be a more appropriate governance mode than 
outsourcing from the market. 
Similarly, researchers have characterized the features of such resources and 
studied how the features affect firms’ governance choice. According to Barney (1991), a 
resource is strategically critical if it is valuable to the firm, rare among competitors, and 
difficult to substitute and imitate by competitors. The main feature identified is core 
competence, which refers to the capabilities that enable a firm to deliver its unique value 
to customers and create sustainable competitive advantage for the firm (Quinn 1999). 
Core competence should be kept inside a firm. It embodies an organizations collective 
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learning over time on how to coordinate and integrate diverse knowledge and skills 
within the firm to achieve objectives and superior performance. Such capabilities may 
lose value if outsourced because it is difficult to achieve the coordination and integration 
synergy in the market and makes the firm vulnerable to competitor learning and imitation 
(Quinn and Hilmer 1994). 
However, both streams did not get the full picture of changes in firms’ 
governance structure in recent years.  First, firms have been proactively building flexible 
enterprises that tap into specialized capabilities and advantages of different firms and 
locations. We have witnessed the disaggregation of large firms to a nexus of relationships 
between specialized firms (Schilling & Steensma 2001). According to TCE and RBV, 
there should be a decrease in asset specificity, uncertainty and tacitness in firms’ business 
activities, which is contradictory to the observation that firms are getting more 
knowledge (tacit skills)-oriented and focusing on specific competitive advantages. 
Second, the recent BPO trend reveals that there is heterogeneity in firms’ sourcing 
choices for generic business processes such as payroll, tax and account payable. These 
processes are in general not core business operations and seldom company specific. The 
operations and rules have little variation among firms. Thus TCE & RBV seem not be 
able to explain the differences in choice of sourcing mechanisms. We stipulate that there 
are characteristics of the firm other than TCE & RBV related factors affecting firms’ 
sourcing choice of business processes. 
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2.2. LITERATURE ON THE CHOICE OF CONTRACT TYPES 
The majority of normative economic theories of contracting focuses on the ex 
ante information asymmetry and prescribes a menu of contracts to screen and provide 
incentive to cope with adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Grossman and Hart, 
1983; Milgram and Roberts, 1992; Laffont and Tirole 1993). Some IS researchers have 
studied contracting strategies for IS outsourcing within this normative stream. For 
instance, Whang (1992) recognized the goal incongruence caused by the information 
asymmetry that external developers may have private information about the cost structure 
of the project while the firm holds private evaluation about the value of the system in a 
multiple-stage development project. He proposed a “viable” contract to replicate the first-
best results of the “hypothetical” in-house development that has no incentive alignment 
issues involved but the same level of expertise and cost effectiveness as external vendors. 
Similarly, Wang et al. (1997) designed an optimal contract for software development to 
achieve the first-best results when both the user and developer hold private information 
about the value and the cost, respectively of the project. Both contracts proposed 
comprehensive contingent plans for uncertain situations. 
More recently, researchers have noticed that empirical evidence and practitioners’ 
reports often show that firms use variants of rather simple fundamental contract types 
(Fixed price, cost-plus and Time & Materials) instead of a menu of contracts (e.g. the 
construction procurement contracting mentioned in Bajari and Tadelis (2001), software 
contracting in Banerjee and Duflo (2000)). In these industries and projects, the problem 
of ex ante information asymmetry is not as salient as ex post adaptation. Studies began to 
look at how those simple contract types are chosen to account for ex post uncertainties. 
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For instance, Bajari and Tadelis (2001) found that FP and CP2 are associated with 
different levels of incentive and renegotiation costs. Thus the choice of contract is to 
achieve the optimal balance of reduced incentive (CP) and increased renegotiation costs 
(FP). 
Building upon the features of contracts, researchers have identified outsourcing 
project- and firm-related factors that affect the choice of contract types. The link between 
factors and the choice is established by analyzing how factors affect potential risks and 
uncertainties and thus the contract choice. For instance, if a process is likely to change in 
the future, it may entail significant costs for renegotiation. Thus the firm may choose 
T&M contracts to alleviate the stress of renegotiation at the cost of incentive for cost 
savings. Bajari and Tadelis (2001) found that project complexity, which imply high 
probability of ex post adaptation, tend to be procured with CP because it has less friction 
in renegotiation.  Banerjee and Duflo (2000) emphasized the impact of reputation. Their 
study on Indian software industry found older and certified (reputable) vendors are more 
likely to be engaged in CP contracts and larger, complex projects than younger firms. 
Gopal et al. (2003) also examined offshore software development outsourcing contracts 
and their findings supported that projects with higher requirement uncertainty and risk for 
the vendor have a higher probability to adopt T&M contracts. Similar patterns are found 
in Slaughter et al. (2005) that software projects with higher requirement ambiguity and 
complexity are more likely to be associated with T&M contracts than CP and FP.  
                                                 
2 Their definition of CP is inclusive. T&M is the extreme case that the client compensates for all costs 
instead of partial costs in CP. Our definition separates T&M from CP. 
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The contract choice is to achieve balance between incentives to reduce costs and 
contract completeness and flexibility for changes. Prior literature often examines the 
direct impact of transaction characteristics on the choice after theoretically arguing link 
between characteristics and costs because it is difficult to measure the costs. As Masten et 
al. (1991) pointed out, Williamson’s TCE framework links the “observed [transaction] 
characteristics and organizational forms”, and allows operationalization of the TCE 
theory even with difficulties in observing and measuring transaction costs. Most TCE-
based empirical papers have provided consistent support for the theoretical predictions of 
the relationship between transaction characteristics and governance choices without 
directly measuring transaction costs. For instance, asset specificity of a transaction is 
theorized to lead to higher transaction costs and the literature has found that a transaction 
with higher level of asset specificity is more likely to be kept in-house. Table 1 
summarizes some most-cited TCE-based papers and the variables they studied. As shown 
in the column of measurement of transaction cost, almost all papers took the implicit 
framework that studies the characteristics of a transaction. We need more explicit 
treatment of costs for contract choices because the choice is to make a trade-off choice 
between different costs, not dependent on the sum of coordination and negotiation costs. 
The choice of contract types and the choice of sourcing mechanisms are often 
mixed in the literature since both are affected by the concerns of ex post costs of 
outsourcing. Baraji and Tadelis (2001) made a connection between their contract choice 
analysis and TCE analysis. They made the analogy that internal development (make) is 
like a T&M contract as the firm bears the costs while outsourcing (buy) operates as a 
fixed-price contract to the client as the vendor takes care of the production and the 
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associated costs. The main factors that affect contract choices: ambiguity and uncertainty 
(Gopal et al. 2003; Slaughter et al. 2005) are similarly identified in TCE to affect the 
choice of sourcing mechanisms. If the factors affect the choice of sourcing mechanisms 
continue to affect the contract choice after the outsourcing decision is made, the two 
choices may not be independent. We need to take into account the effect of the sourcing 
decision on the contract choice.  
Our study systematically examines the impact of business characteristics on ex 
post coordination and negotiation costs and the contract choice to address the cost 
concerns. We contribute to the literature by 1) systematically examining the impact of 
business process characteristics on coordination and negotiation costs; 2) establishing the 
direct link between the contract choice and cost concerns; 3) considering the selection 
bias of the choice of sourcing mechanisms on the choice of contract types. 
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Chapter 3 Business Process Characteristics 
As we put our investigation in the context of business process outsourcing, the 
focal transaction per se includes a wide variety of business processes such as financial 
and accounting, marketing and sales, and supply chain processes. We first need to clarify 
the characteristics of business processes that may impact these costs. 
A business process is a collection of actions or functions that produces output for 
customers (e.g. Pentland 2003; Ittner and Larcker 1997; Garvin 1998; Ray et. al 2004; 
Benner and Tushman 2003). Knowledge and innovations generate and evolve from 
business processes, and a firms’ capabilities and strategies are embedded in them (e.g. 
Ittner and Larcker 1997; Garvin 1998; Ray et. al 2004; Benner and Tushman 2003). 
Often human tacit knowledge and understanding are critical for the execution of 
processes. Business processes are not static; they evolve over time with learning and 
changes in the environment. With all the tangible and intangible components waved in 
the structure of a business process, it is very difficult to give a complete description of a 
business process in advance. Firms usually need to put together a cross-functional team to 
develop a comprehensive contract, which indicates high costs of drafting such a contract 
(Ranganathan and Balaji 2007). These characteristics have implications for ex post 
adaptation between the client and the vendor and thus the choice of sourcing mechanisms 
and the choice of contract types. 
Human resources are fundamental to most organizational processes (Katzenstein 
and Lerch 2000). Thus, the shift from domestic insourcing to any other sourcing 
mechanisms involves the transfer of human capital and the embedded knowledge. As 
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discussed earlier, when the human capital and embedded knowledge are specific to the 
firm, the ex-post opportunistic behavior of the vendor may increase. This behavior is 
often associated with loss of bargaining power due to asset specific investments (e.g., 
Williamson 1985; Klein et al. 1978) and loss of resource control (Teece 1987; Clemons 
and Reddi 1993). The specific assets involve sunk physical and human investments that 
are specific to the transaction and can hardly be redeployed outside the current 
contractual relationship. The firm’s ability to shift to other vendors in the competitive 
market is diminished. Thus, the firm becomes vulnerable to “hold-up” by the vendor 
(Williamson 1985, Klein et al. 1978). When business processes have significant human 
capital and embedded knowledge, outsourcing may entail significant opportunism risk. 
When the vendor leverages its bargaining position with the client, renegotiation happens 
and the client has potential benefit loss from the renegotiation. 
Organizational processes evolve over time and are often tightly integrated with 
other organizational processes. When processes evolve they are subject to frequent 
changes and learning (e.g. Utterback and Abernathy 1975; Adner and Levinthal 2001), 
which is sometimes referred to as the extent of process maturity (Harter et al. 2000). If 
the maturity of the process is low, there is higher uncertainty in its daily operations. 
Adjustments of procedures, communication and personnel may happen unexpectedly. 
Such uncertainty has implications to transaction cost. Also the vendor and the client both 
share the uncertainty of process and environment changes after the contract is signed. 
Product and process modularity has gained significant attention in recent times, 
since it has implications to manageability, coordination costs, and accommodation of 
future uncertainty (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; 2004). Physical product designs have 
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incorporated modular design principles to lower cost, make changes without affecting 
other parts, and improve time-to-market. On similar lines, processes that are modular can 
be detached, reconfigured, and modified without affecting other organizational processes 
fairy easily (Schilling and Steensma 2001). Thus, process modularity has implications for 
coordination costs (Tanriverdi et al. 2007). Also standardization of modular processes 
reduced the requirements for specific adaptation and thus impact transaction costs. 
Business processes operate to a large extent on IT infrastructure (Malone and 
Crowston 1994; Broadbent et al. 1999). In manufacturing sourcing, portable production 
technology is necessary for producing in a foreign country (e.g. Leamer 1984). Likewise, 
IT infrastructure needs to be “portable” across geographic distance and support easy 
detachment of business processes. A firm with IT infrastructure that is less standardized 
and highly customized will lower the chances to find vendors with compatible IT 
infrastructure, or incur high coordination and setup costs. The level of IT-business 
coupling can influence both transaction and coordination costs (Tanriverdi et al. 2007). 
Not all firms have IT infrastructures that facilitate offshoring and outsourcing due to poor 
architectural design since it prevents firms to detach their processes. 
Besides the well-studied specificity characteristics, we introduce three new 
constructs that may significantly affect transaction cost based on TCE and organizational 
theories: maturity, modularity and IT detachability. We built our theories and hypotheses 
of the choice of sourcing mechanisms and the choice of contract types on the 
characterization of business processes. 
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Chapter 4 The Choice of Sourcing Mechanisms 
4.1 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
We posit that the sourcing choice of business process is associated with 
organizational design characteristics. We build on modular systems theory to analyze 
firms’ potential to unbundle business processes and address our query on firms’ choice of 
different sourcing mechanisms. Modular systems theory views the firm differently, as a 
complex, hierarchically nested system (Simon, 1962). Each component of the system is, 
in turn, a subsystem of finer components. The system may be “nearly decomposable”, 
“loosely coupled” or “modular” when interactions between components are limited and it 
is possible to separate and recombine into different configurations (Simon 1962, Orton & 
Weick 1990). Researchers have applied the theory to understand how the system 
structure affects firms’ choice of organizational forms. Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) 
found that product and organizational modularity reduces the cost and difficulty of 
adaptive coordination and thus increases firms’ strategic flexibility in organizing product 
development and utilizing a network of component capabilities from other organizations. 
Baldwin and Clark (2000) argued that modular design enables firms to outsource and 
benefits from the competition of suppliers. Schilling and Steensma (2001) studied why 
the locus of production shifts from large scale hierarchical firms shifting to a network of 
component firms that contribute to production at the industry level. Novak and Eppinger 
(2001) examined the relationship between product complexity and vertical integration. 
Viewing modular design as one aspect of complexity, they found that higher complexity 
(lower modularity) makes auto firms more likely to be integrated than to outsource 
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components. Their findings supported that modular organizational forms improve firms’ 
flexibility to cope with changing environment and make use of different arrangements of 
production. In general, modular organizational design enables firms to disaggregate 
business activities and configure them into different arrangements of production such as 
outsourcing and alliances. 
Our analysis level of modular design is business processes. A firm is a 
combination of business processes that interact with each other to accomplish various 
organizational goals. The firm defines the structure of the system, including how to 
divide the required functionality among processes, where to perform the processes, how 
to achieve communication and coordination among them, and how to put their outcomes 
together without loss of functionality. Modular system design of business processes refers 
to a loosely-coupled system of business processes (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996). The 
design has three components: architecture, interface and standards. The architecture 
defines the blueprint of the system: what processes it has and what functionality they 
perform. Interfaces clarify how business processes work together and communicate with 
each other. Standards ensure processes conform to interface specifications and achieve 
certain performance requirements. A modular system of business processes has well 
defined processes, interfaces and performance specifications.  
Modular business processes bestows firms the flexibility to organize its activities 
through a wide range of sourcing mechanisms. Modular design aims to minimize 
interdependence among processes and make them self-contained. Information, actions 
and procedures to perform a business process is largely encapsulated within a process. 
The process works autonomously without consulting, interacting and exchanging with 
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other processes too much. Communications are through well-defined interfaces with 
specific information about inputs and outputs. Details of inner working of business 
processes are not necessary for processes to fit and work together. To the extent that 
business processes are relatively independent from each other and interact through well-
defined interfaces, it is easy to adapt to different configurations of the system. 
We examine the effect of modular design on the choice of sourcing mechanisms 
from the cost perspective of firms’ governance choice. A business process is associated 
with certain characteristics that lead to different costs level under different sourcing 
mechanisms. The firm’s choice should align the process with the appropriate sourcing 
mechanism that incurs the least costs. We consider three types of costs: transaction costs, 
coordination costs and production costs. Transaction costs refer to the potential loss due 
to opportunistic behavior and maladaptation in a contractual relationship. Asset 
specificity and uncertainty of executing a business process increase transaction costs of 
outsourcing. Coordination costs of outsourcing arise from the complexity of information 
processing, communication and decision making in accomplishing tasks jointly across 
organizational boundaries (Gulati & Singh 1998, Gurbaxani & Whang 1993). Without 
the hierarchical control and authority mechanisms of an integrated firm, the 
communication and decision-making in outsourcing become more difficult as 
information has to be processed in two different organizations with different coordinating 
structure and mechanisms (Galbraith 1973; Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995). Production 
costs are the mundane costs of running the process, e.g. salaries, materials and 
operational expenses. In general, specialized vendors enjoy lower production costs 
because of economies of scale, competition and pooled demand. Offshore sourcing 
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introduce further savings in production costs due to averagely lower material and human 
resource costs in developing offshore countries. Thus firms usually weighs the savings on 
production costs against the potential loss due to transaction and coordination costs when 
make a sourcing decision. 
Modular process design has implications for ongoing transaction, coordination 
and production costs. Transaction costs decline for two reasons. First standardized 
interfaces and encapsulated functionality of business processes reduce the need to invest 
in firm specific requirements (Langlois 2006, Schilling & Steensma 2001). Second, 
minimized interaction, well-specified interfaces and partners shielded from inner working 
details make it easier to adapt to environment changes (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996, 
Schilling & Steensma 2001) and thus greatly relieve the problem of maladaptation ex 
post. The changes within the process will not significantly affect the design or the 
functions of other processes. If any uncertainty realizes and requires adaptive changes for 
the process, the scope of adaptation should be largely contained within the process and 
thus reduces the potential arenas of frictions and renegotiation. Moreover, modular 
design makes adaptation stays at the level of specifying interfaces, input/output structure 
and performance requirements. It is not so important for the client to specify how to 
execute the process as it is to define those features. For instance, if new functions are 
needed for a business process, the partners only need to work out the interface 
specifications on input/output for the additional requirements and do not need to go into 
specific details on how the vendor should deliver. Modularity implies lower level of 
specificity and maladaption in an arm-length relationship and thus lower transaction 
costs. 
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Coordination costs decrease because of standardized interfaces and performance 
specifications. The well-defined interfaces between other processes reduce the volume 
and diversity of the information that the vendor need to process. Vendors only need to 
know what kinds of inputs (e.g., data, information, tasks, jobs, etc.) they will receive 
from the other processes and what they will provide back to them in return. The 
necessary communication channels and decision-making nodes decrease. The vendor can 
focus on the process more in its control without bargaining with or waiting for the 
responses of other departments of the firm, which often have different objectives and 
incentives. Secondly, coordination between modular components relies more on the pre-
defined specifications than managerial authority. This serves as a form of embedded 
coordination within the system and reduces the need to consult for managerial authority 
or hierarchy for task decomposition or decision making etc. (Orton & Weick 1990, 
Sanchez & Mahoney 1996, Hagel & Brown 2005). 
Modular design makes it more feasible to save on production costs by sourcing 
from markets. Due to the potential decrease in transaction and coordination costs of 
working with a vendor, the benefits of saving on production costs by using market 
vendors are more easily to exceed the potential costs. It is generally true that market 
vendors have lower production costs than an integrated firm. Vendors can pool demand 
across multiple clients, offering standardized services and achieving economies of scale 
and scope (Levina and Ross 2003). 
Modular design affects the choice of sourcing mechanism via its impact on the 
total costs of adopting different sourcing mechanisms for a business process (Tanriverdi 
et al. 2007). Ceteris paribus, a firm with modular design of business processes has more 
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flexibility to choose from a wide range of sourcing mechanisms and glean the maximum 
advantages. With reduced transaction and coordination costs, the feasibility of choosing 
outside vendors increase. In addition to production cost savings, outside vendors can also 
provide specialized capabilities to improve service quality, efficiency and architecture of 
processes. When competitive service providers are available in both US and low-cost 
developing countries, it is attractive for firms to tap into various resources and benefits of 
global vendors. Firms may need to pay more attention to their architectural knowledge 
and capabilities to design modular systems of business processes than details of executing 
non-core business processes. 
In the next section, we develop two new process-level constructs, process 
modularity and IT detachability (ITD) based on Tanriverdi et al. (2007) to assess the 
extent to which a business process can be detached from other processes and the 
underlying IT support infrastructure of the firm, executed elsewhere , and recombined 
without loss of functionality. We explain how and why modularity and the ITD of a 
process are associated with the choice of sourcing mechanism. 
4.2 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Process Modularity 
We define business process modularity as the extent to which a business process 
is loosely coupled, mature and standardized enough to be separated from a firm’s other 
business processes, executed independently, and recombined without loss of functionality 
(Tanriverdi et al. 2007). Our definition states that standardization and maturity of the 
process itself should be necessary conditions for modularity in addition to “loosely 
coupling” or high degree of independence. A business process has a life-cycle (Anderson 
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& Zeithaml 1984, Utterback & Abernathy 1975). When in early stage process maturity is 
low, operational rules and procedures, inputs, outputs, supporting technologies are not 
clearly defined. Run-time exceptions and problems are common. Frequent changes are 
required not only in the process but also in other processes affected by it. Thus it is 
difficult to set stable, standardized interfaces between the focal process and other 
processes. Maturity ensures that the process is documented, managed, measured, 
controlled, and continually improved (CMMI 2002). Standardization ensures that the 
process communicates and performs to common rules and specifications shared by other 
processes, which makes it easy to specify standardized interfaces and performance 
specifications. As shown in Figure 1, Process  A , B, E have high level of modularity 
while Process C, D are tightly coupled with each other. 
Process modularity impacts the choice of sourcing mechanisms by reducing 
transaction and coordination costs and thus increasing the feasibility of taking production 
cost advantages of offshore and domestic vendors (Tanriverdi et al. 2007). Transaction 
costs decrease as specificity and uncertainty in the relationship are alleviated because of 
modular design. First mature, standard, and modular processes make it less costly for the 
client to switch to an alternative vendor as established, self-contained routines will not 
need significant firm-specific adjustments or investments from the vendor (Klein et al. 
1978, Williamson 1985).  Second, mature processes are less prone to uncertainties in 
execution and standard interfaces ensure minimal intervention needed when things 
change. Thus the costs for ex post adaptation for modular business processes are lower. 
Coordination costs arising from managing interdependence decrease. Well-defined 
interfaces, inputs and outputs work as an embedded coordination mechanism that requires 
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limited managerial involvement, information sharing and decision making. Enabled by 
the lower transaction and coordination costs, firms have greater freedom to disaggregate 
and tap into the advantages of different sourcing mechanisms when process modularity is 
higher. The production cost premium achieved from vendors increases as the offsetting 
transaction and coordination costs decrease. In summary process modularity affects the 
total costs of adopting different sourcing mechanisms and thus influences the choice of 
sourcing mechanism. Therefore, 
H1: Modularity level of a business process is significantly associated with the 
choice of sourcing mechanisms. 
Next we analyze the features of offshore outsourcing and domestic outsourcing and 
examine how these features align with different levels of process modularity. We 
simplify domestic outsourcing as using large, mature US companies and offshore 
outsourcing as using relative smaller, new players in developing countries. Both being 
outsourcing mechanisms, the difference between “offshore” and “domestic” goes beyond 
the geographic difference and the obviously lower production costs of the former. 
Domestic and offshore vendors are different in size, development stage and capabilities 
and operate under different market conditions. Such difference leads to different cost 
structures and value propositions and thus may be suitable for processes with different 
levels of modularity. 
First the sources of cost savings and efficiency are different for domestic and offshore 
vendors. For domestic vendors, cost savings and efficiency are achieved through 
economies of scale and specialization by pooling the demand and supply. Thus pooling 
and standardizing similar processes for a number of clients should be the focus of large 
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domestic vendors. They can also tap into the production cost advantage of offshore 
countries by delegate to their own offshore centers, but this may require event higher 
level of modularity of the processes (Tanriverdi et al. 2007). For offshore vendors in 
emerging economies such as India, China or East Europe, their technological and 
managerial capabilities have not been ready to reap the economies of scale and 
specialization. The major source of the cost savings of offshore vendors comes from the 
availability of abundant inexpensive local factors such as human resources. 
Differentiating the sources of cost savings helps to evaluate the gains of sourcing 
alternatives according to different characteristics of the business process. For instance, if 
the major costs of a business process are for human resource, the savings will be 
relatively large by outsourcing to an offshore vendor. In another case, domestic vendors 
may entail higher benefits from economy of scales if the processes that are common 
among the client firms while the offshore vendors usually cannot do so because they do 
not have the same size of client base. 
Second the value proposition of offshore vendors may include services that require 
working closely and adaptively with clients while domestic vendors may be more 
interested in taking over processes and transforming them according to their definitions. 
From an evolutionary perspective, firms in emerging economies have motivations to 
learn (Newman 2000; Uhlenbruck, Meyer, and Hitt 2003). Domestic vendors may have 
established “best practices” of the industry by working with a variety of clients, whereas 
offshore vendors are in the stage of beginning to learn and grow. Thus offshore vendors 
may propose to grow and change with clients to satisfy their needs while domestic 
vendors may be eager to separate the client from the black box of process operations. 
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Persuading domestic vendors to customize to the needs of the client is more difficult than 
initiating changes in offshore vendors who have no established routines and structures. 
Also as offshore vendors may rely on US clients, the clients have the monopoly power 
over the vendors. It is possible for the client to present “take-or-leave-it” offer to the 
vendor when some changes or renegotiations happen. As the vendor cannot risk losing its 
important income source, it has to agree to the requirements of the client’s offer. The 
willingness of delivering specific services other than standardized operations is rather 
important when business processes involve high level of uncertainties and variations.  
We posit that firms are more likely to choose domestic outsourcing when process 
modularity is higher. When modularity is higher, domestic vendors are attractive in 
several aspects. First, the production cost savings of outsourcing may surpass more easily 
the lower transaction and coordination costs associated with high modular processes. 
Thus outsourcing is more feasible relative to in-house operations (domestic insourcing) 
as modularity increases. Second, when going for outsourcing, firms can expect higher 
benefits from domestic vendors than offshore vendors. High modularity ensures that 
domestic vendors can tap in the production cost advantage of offshore countries by 
establishing subsidiaries overseas without incurring high costs of coordinating and 
managing operations overseas. Thus domestic vendors can achieve similar production 
cost savings as offshore vendors. In the mean time, working with large, reputable 
domestic vendors does not generate as many costs as searching, assessing and managing 
offshore vendors. The cultural difference, geographic distance and relatively immature 
economic and institutional environment of offshore countries make it more difficult to 
coordinate with offshore vendors than with similar US vendors. Thus given similar 
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production cost savings enabled by high modularity level, domestic vendors are more 
appealing than offshore vendors with lower transaction and coordination costs, better 
technological and managerial expertise and quality assurance in general.  
Offshore outsourcing becomes more appealing than domestic insourcing and 
outsourcing when modularity is lower. At low levels of modularity, a process is 
immature, nonstandard, and tightly coupled with other processes of the firm. Delegating 
the process becomes difficult because of higher transaction and coordination costs. The 
firm’s flexibility to take advantage of different sourcing mechanisms is restricted. 
Presented with opportunities to source for lower costs and higher quality from specialized 
vendors in current situation, the firm is eager to jump on the wagon even when conditions 
are not mature and looking for external capabilities to restructure its business processes 
for such strategic flexibility (Tanriverdi et al. 2007). For domestic vendors that seek to 
exploit economies of scale and scope through standardization across clients may be 
reluctant to provide services to such processes because they have to be heavily involved 
in firm-specific modularization tasks. Instead of taking over a modular process, the 
vendor should first help the firm architect the system, re-define immature processes, 
standardize interfaces, and specify performance criteria. The implementation involves not 
only the focal process, but other processes and strategic operations at higher architectural 
level. Frequent interaction and adaptation with different departments of the firm are 
normal. A domestic outsourcing vendor may not be willing to provide such services since 
they can neither shift the process to offshore subsidiaries easily for cost benefits nor 
invest much in specific adaptation to a certain firm. All these are in conflict with their 
business model of economies of scale and specialization.  
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In this context, offshore vendors offer different solutions. First, one of their 
important value propositions is to transform business based on modularization (Eastwood 
2006). For example, Infosys, a leading Indian vendor, promotes the strategy of “modular 
global sourcing” and the Global Delivery Model (GDM), which “applies the fundamental 
concepts of modularization to business process and IT application and infrastructure 
services sourcing decision making, implementation, and ongoing management” (Infosys 
2007). Wipro, a major competitor, also promises to “assist in development, 
implementation and support of modular, scalable and global enterprise resource planning 
(ERP), B2E, B2C, B2B, B2Bi and E2E solutions catering to extended enterprise (Wipro 
2007). Second, offshore vendors are more likely to take modularization tasks because 
they are more willing to adapt to firms specific requirements for reasons mentioned 
before. They are also motivated to learn and grow by serving US clients. Initial cost 
advantage cannot sustain offshore vendors in the long run as it will eventually erode with 
rising labor costs and US competitors expanding overseas. They ought to gain in-depth 
understanding of businesses in US companies and move toward providers of capabilities 
rather than cheap labor. US companies have already been asking for innovation and 
improvement ideas for their processes from offshore vendors, not treating them as mere 
low-cost alternatives (Murphy 2008). Thus offshore vendors are more motivated to 
interact, involve in different levels of business operations and seek for innovative 
solutions with US clients. In summary offshore outsourcing is better aligned with firms 
needs when process modularity is lower. Therefore: 
H1a: When modularity is higher, the likelihood of choosing domestic outsourcing 
relative to domestic insourcing is higher. 
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H1b: When modularity is higher, the likelihood of choosing domestic outsourcing 
relative to offshore outsourcing is higher. 
H1c: When modularity is lower, the likelihood of choosing offshore outsourcing 
relative to domestic insourcing is higher. 
IT Detachability 
We define the ITD of a business process as the extent to which the process and its 
underlying IT infrastructure are loosely coupled to allow separation, independent 
execution of the process on another IT infrastructure, and recombination without loss of 
functionality (Tanriverdi et al. 2007) The definition emphasizes modular design between 
the target business process and its underlying IT infrastructure. It follows the concept of 
process modularity that the process and the IT infrastructure should be loosely coupled 
and interact through standardized interfaces.  The unique features of IT infrastructure 
however make the construct to capture different aspects.  The IT infrastructure the 
business process running on usually involves the whole system of operating systems, 
applications, file and data, not a module of IT services componentized for the specific 
process. A lot of business processes rely on the integrated IT infrastructure for data 
transfer, information sharing and interaction. In most firms, IT infrastructure represents a 
legacy system that integrates all types of operating systems, software, file structures and 
data over years of development. The system is customized and tightly coupled to the 
specific needs of the firm (Figure 2). Although IT professionals have been promoting 
solutions such as ERP systems, IT service as utilities and Service-Oriented Architecture 
(SOA) to either over-haul or piecemeal reform legacy systems, tightly coupled systems 
are still prevalent in firms. Two types of architecture make it possible to detach a 
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business process from the IT infrastructure and run it on a different system without much 
customization. First the process has little specific customization to the infrastructure and 
can be plug-and-play to any general IT platform (Figure 3, processes A, B and C). 
Second, the supporting IT infrastructure is componentized as well. The process and the 
IT infrastructure are encapsulated together as an integrated service component and ready 
to be disaggregated and recombined with other similar service components to perform 
business functions (Figure 4). This reflects the ideal picture of SOA design, but not quite 
the reality of most firms. 
ITD affects the choice of sourcing mechanism by affecting the feasibility of 
detaching a business process from the firm’s IT infrastructure (Tanriverdi et al. 2007). 
For cases like that shown in Figure 2, a business process that is tightly coupled with IT 
infrastructure requires significant initial setup and customization from the vendor. For 
instance, an accounting process was developed on a database system that was expensive 
and popular then (e.g. DB2) with a relatively unique programming language. Over time, 
as the company grows and changes, the IT part of the process has constantly been 
patched, modified and updated. Its connections to other processes are implemented using 
specific languages and features of the legacy IT system. Running the accounting process 
is not shielded from the underlying details of the system. The vendor specialized in 
accounting processes shall take care of not only the accounting tasks, but maintenance 
and development of the underlying IT. Thus to farm out such a process, one possible 
solution is for the vendor to build a compatible IT environment that the business process 
can run on. However, it is difficult and costly to imitate a legacy system that evolves over 
time using specific technologies. The customized IT connections with other processes 
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also incur significant adaptation work. Another possible solution is for the firm to 
modularize the IT infrastructure by itself to the case shown in Figure 4. Overhauling the 
whole IT infrastructure and replace it with a complete new infrastructure has been proved 
costly and risky. Firms that were tired of managing and maintaining legacy IT systems 
built on product combo and firm-specific codes tried to get rid of the headache by 
adopting standard ERP systems for a fresh start. It turned out that such projects were 
extremely expensive and more than half of them failed and dragged the firms into 
trouble. It will be even more difficult for a vendor to work with the firm for 
modularization because the vendor has to understand in depth the client’s business and 
coordinate with other departments as an outsider. The third potential solution is to 
transfer the whole infrastructure altogether to a vendor that has the capability to manage, 
maintain and improve IT infrastructure. This solution is more likely to work out with 
domestic vendors. First it is not very likely to physically moving integrated IT 
infrastructure (hardware, software, employees) across firm boundaries or geographic 
distance. Most large-scale IT outsourcing cases show that infrastructure remains within 
client firms and vendors employees work on the client’s premise. Second sending 
employees to remotely work in US will undermine the vendor’s cost advantage and 
create managerial problems. Also transporting low-cost labors from foreign countries to 
US is under immigration restrictions (Ethiraj et al. 2005). Domestic vendors have the 
scale and capabilities to take the ownership of the infrastructure and employees together, 
while client firms may not be aware of the transition too much because the IT department 
is still in the same building with the same staff members.  Moreover, most dominant 
domestic vendors are originally specialized in IT outsourcing and have been successfully 
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running IT infrastructure for firms for years. Firms usually rely on their technologic 
innovations and expertise to bring strategic reform to IT infrastructure (Quinn & Hilmer 
1994). Thus domestic vendors are valuable when low ITD inhibits firms’ ability to 
unbundle business processes for benefits of different sourcing mechanisms. Therefore: 
H2: The ITD of a business process is significantly associated with the choice of 
sourcing mechanism. 
H2a: The likelihood of choosing domestic outsourcing relative to domestic 
insourcing increases when ITD decreases. 
When ITD increases, business processes have well-defined and standardized 
interfaces with IT infrastructure (Figure 3, Process A, B and C). When input/output and 
communication protocols between the process and the infrastructure specified, the 
process can operate separately from the infrastructure. The location and technical details 
of the infrastructure will not affect where and how the process runs. The firm can 
unbundle business processes from the IT infrastructure and source from vendors without 
entailing extra costs of infrastructure building. Offshore vendors become more attractive 
when ITD increases. As higher ITD ensures the feasibility of using offshore vendors, the 
cost advantage gives firms the incentive to use offshore vendors.  Domestic vendors have 
less flexibility to tap into the cheap labor in foreign countries because the extra layer of 
IT infrastructure between theirs and the subsidiaries’. The client firm connects to the 
domestic vendor, which in turn, connects to IT infrastructure of an offshore subsidiary. 
The additional connections consume computing and network resources that are not as 
extensive in developing countries as in US. Therefore,  
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H2b: The likelihood of choosing offshore outsourcing relative to domestic 
outsourcing increases when ITD increases. 
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Chapter 5 The Choice of Contract Types 
5.1. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
We build on TCE framework for the analysis of negotiation costs and on modular 
systems theory for the analysis of coordination costs. Coordination costs and 
renegotiation costs are often treated similarly under the umbrella of contractual costs. So 
are their antecedents. Organizational literature has suggested that coordination costs is 
based on a perspective of organizational structure rather than risk and has different 
antecedents from opportunistic transaction cost. Gulati and Singh (1998) clarified the role 
of coordination costs, in addition to opportunism-based transaction costs (appropriation 
concerns in their term), in determining firms’ governance choices for strategic alliances. 
They defined coordination costs as “organizational complexity of decomposing tasks 
among partners along with ongoing coordination of activities to be completed jointly or 
individually across organizational boundaries and the related extent of communication 
and decisions that would be necessary”. Hierarchical controls should facilitate 
coordination because they establish formal procedures for the interactions between 
parties and thus minimize communication, simplify decision making, reduce uncertainty 
and prevent potential disputes. Thus anticipation for higher coordination costs leads to 
the choice of more hierarchical controls. Interdependence of activities across partners 
rather than specificity and uncertainty is identified as an important antecedent of 
coordination costs. Second, different transaction situations may have different impact on 
the two types of cost and thus the governance choice. For instance, firms’ bargaining 
power may alleviate opportunism-based transaction cost but not necessarily the 
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coordination costs because the latter depends on organizational structures of the two 
parties’ interaction. More recently, modular systems theory suggests that modular 
organizational design can reduce the coordination costs of disaggregating activities. The 
flexibility of modular design designates great freedom for a firm to organize its activities 
through a wide range of mechanisms, e.g. outsourcing, multi-sourcing.   
The literature summarized the differences between three fundamental types of 
contract, as shown in Table 73 (Ibbs et al 1986; Bajari and Tadelis 2001). Researchers 
have mainly considered the trade-off between incentive to reduce costs and flexibility for 
change, which indicates lower costs for negotiation/renegotiation4, of choosing different 
contract types. As Table 7 shows, the levels of incentive and negotiation costs associated 
with the three types of contract are different. FP contracts entail the highest costs for 
negotiation because detailed operation and performance specifications have to be 
carefully specified ex ante in the contracts and ex post when uncertainties happen.  
Vendors need the contract to account for future situations as complete as possible to 
avoid any surprises that may incur additional costs in the future. T&M contracts, on the 
contrary, have the least requirements for detailed description. The negotiation process is 
simpler as the client inherently agrees to pay for extra costs under any foreseen or 
unforeseen circumstances. Such commitment renders gauging every single detail in the 
contract to cope with possible changes unnecessary. In terms of incentive structure, FP 
                                                 
3 The table is developed based on the comparison between FP and CP in Baraji and 
Tadelis (2001), who summarized the literature. As T&M represents an extreme of CP, we 
extend their table to accommodate T&M contracts. 
4 From here on, we generally refer negotiation and renegotiation costs as negotiation 
costs.  
 41
contracts provide strongest incentive for the vendor to reveal all relevant information to 
draft a contract as complete as possible ex ante and to achieve exact what is specified in 
the contract ex post to avoid any extra costs. Also the vendor will be investing in cost-
saving efforts to increase his profit given a fixed price. T&M contracts give lowest 
incentive for the vendor to provide product/service as described since the vendor’s 
profitability may not vary much if changes or adaptation are needed ex post. With a risk-
sharing arrangement, CP contracts fall in between FP and T&M contracts to achieve a 
balance between incentive and negotiation costs. They need to control overrun as they 
have a share in it while also have some flexibility to let go stringent details in negotiation. 
The contract choice is to balance cost-reduction incentive and contract 
completeness and flexibility to change. We first clarify the impact of business process 
characteristics on coordination and negotiation costs and the impact of the costs on the 
choice of contract types  
5.2. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
5.2.1 Business process characteristics and negotiation costs 
The negotiation costs refer to the costs for ex post adaptation. Thus it includes not 
only the real costs of renegotiating and writing the contract, but the costs of potential 
opportunistic behavior of the vendor, as analyzed in the first study using TCE. Due to the 
complex and unpredictable reality, it is often very costly to write and enforce a complete 
contract, if not impossible (Tirole 1999). Thus outsourcing is subject to ex post 
opportunistic behavior and friction in unexpected situations that incur renegotiation and 
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adaptation. There are mainly two types of contractual risks: hold-up problem and 
maladaptation (Tadelis 2002).  
Hold-up problem is caused by the relationship-specific investment, which creates 
value only in the current contractual relationship (Klein et al. 1978; Williamson 1985). 
As specific investments limit the ability to switch to other firms, the investing party is 
under the threat of loss on its investments due to the other party’s opportunistic 
renegotiation and expropriation because the incomplete contract leaves discretion for the 
other party to use its bargaining power to exploit the investing party. For example, if the 
client firm has invested in some specific training of the employees of the vendor that is 
unforeseen in the initial contract, the vendor will have the bargaining power to set a 
higher service price, otherwise the client has to give up its initial investments. Fearing 
that the other party will “hold it up”, each party is reluctant to make the specific 
investments that would be optimal and thus results in efficiency loss. When the threat of 
hold-up and efficiency loss is substantial (e.g. the party’s investments are important for 
the productivity), the firm tends to keep the process inside the firm.  
The vast theoretical and empirical TCE literature has established that several 
types of asset specificity of the transaction may cause the hold-up problem, including 
physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, site specificity and temporal 
specificity, etc. (Boerner and Macher 2001). In our context, we will focus on the human 
asset specificity because human investments are usually substantial and important costs 
for accomplishing business processes (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997).   
We define human capital specificity of a business process as the extent to which 
human skills, knowledge and understanding associated with a business process are firm-
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specific and non-transferable to other uses (Williamson 1979, 1985, Anderson 1985). We 
also define negotiation costs as Thus: 
H1: The higher the human capital specificity of the process, the higher the perceived 
negotiation costs. 
Another major cause of negotiation costs is the difficulty of the parties to adapt to 
changes. TCE literature refers such difficulty as maladaptation problem, defined as “the 
haggling and friction due to ex post changes and adaptations when contracts are 
incomplete” (Tadelis 2002). Bargaining over the changes is time-consuming and wastes 
resources. Furthermore, if the parties have private information in the bargaining stage, 
e.g. the vendor may know more about the current costs, they may fail to reach an efficient 
agreement. Higher uncertainty and complexity would lead to higher difficulty in ex post 
implementation. For example, variables such as market demand, government regulation, 
or the action of competitors cannot be completely foreseen and unambiguously specified 
ex ante.  
The maturity level of a process affects negotiation costs. A business process has a 
life-cycle that is similar to a product life cycle (Utterback and Abernathy 1975; Porter 
1983; Anderson and Zeithaml 1984). In the early phases of the life-cycle, the business 
process is not mature yet. It entails a lot of uncertainty. Its operational rules and 
procedures, inputs, outputs, supporting technologies, and interfaces with other business 
processes are not defined well and still evolving. Employees are learning about and 
becoming familiar with the process. Run-time exceptions and problems are common. On 
the contrary, a matured process is characterized with well-established procedures, 
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routinized operations and self-sufficient management. There is seldom future changes in 
the process and thus the need for ex post adaptation. Thus:  
H2: The higher the maturity of the process, the lower the perceived negotiation costs. 
5.2.2 Business process characteristics and coordination costs 
Coordination costs are distinct from negotiation costs (Gulati and Singh 1998). 
Even if the parties are perfectly trustable for not moving opportunistically, they must still 
coordinate the division of tasks and the interface of activities. As in business process 
outsourcing, the services are information intensive and the vendor has to interact with the 
client for the delivery of services, coordination costs may be significant in the 
implementation stage because of the need for information-processing (Galbraith 1973; 
Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995). Factors that increase the needs for information 
processing, make communication more difficult or complicate the decision-making 
process between the partners will incur higher coordination costs. Organizational 
researchers have established that the level of interdependence may encapsulate the 
organizational structures that impact coordination costs (Galbraith 1971). 
Recent development in modular systems theory provides lens to examine the 
interdependence of a process and other processes in a firm. The theory views a firm as a 
complex system of a large number of business processes that have many interactions with 
each other in the value chain (Porter 1983). Such complex systems can be managed by 
unbundling the system into modular components, and using standardized interfaces, 
inputs, and outputs (Meyer and Lehnerd 1997; Garud et al. 2003). Modular business 
processes can be disaggregated and recombined into new configurations with little loss of 
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functionality (Schilling and Steensma 2001). Modularity makes it possible to operate and 
change a business process without affecting other business processes or functions. The 
scope of coordination is confined to a single business process, where operations, changes, 
and problems do not have to be interdependent on other processes or departments. The 
partners only need to know about inputs and outputs of the process, which minimizes 
communication and reduces information-processing requirements. Thus: 
H3: The higher the modularity of the process, the lower the perceived coordination costs. 
IT detachability is another construct grounded the modular systems theory, but 
from IT perspective. We define it as the extent to which the business process can be 
separated from firm’s underlying IT infrastructure and executed on another IT system 
without loss of functionality. Business processes and their underlying IT support 
infrastructures complement and mutually influence each other (Barua and 
Mukhopadhyay 2000). Productive use of IT usually requires redesign of business 
processes, whereas the redesign of business processes is usually facilitated by IT 
(Davenport and Short 1990). Due to this reciprocal interaction, business processes could 
become tightly intertwined and coupled with their underlying IT support infrastructure.  
A high degree of coupling of business processes and IT leads to high 
interdependence between the business process and the IT infrastructure. As information 
processing, communication and operation flows of a process are all dependent on the IT 
platform, intensive interaction between the process and the IT infrastructure should be 
expected at daily basis. Imagine two partners, one runs the business process, which is 
inherently intertwined with and customized to the IT infrastructure for daily operations, 
which are run by the other partner. The two sides have to work closely and consistently 
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on coordinating tasks, making decisions and solving problems. They will have to invest 
in standardizing, optimizing, and re-engineering the process or to make specific 
investments to customize and adapt the process to each other’s needs. Processes that are 
highly detachable from the infrastructure, however, are encapsulated with standard 
interfaces and portable among IT platforms. The vendor running the process does not 
need to know about the details of the underlying infrastructure. Either transplanting the 
process onto another platform or working with the current one does not generate much 
need for communication and coordination. Thus:  
H4: The higher the IT detachability of the process, the lower the perceived coordination 
costs. 
5.2.3 Negotiation and coordination costs and contract choices 
Firms make appropriate choices of contract types based on expected coordination 
and negotiation costs. Different contract types address the concerns of negotiation and 
coordination costs more or less. Thus the contract choice is to select the type of contract 
that has appropriate features to alleviate or mitigate related concerns.  
Firms with high expected negotiation costs should choose contracts that allow 
flexibility to change. Renegotiating a contract is costly and there is always a risk of the 
vendor leverage its bargaining position for higher share of the profit when ex post 
adaptation is needed. FP starts with as complete as possible descriptions and 
requirements of the process. When uncertainties realize, renegotiation has to go over the 
same process into every detail and thus incurring high negotiation costs. Also the FP 
contractor operates for a fixed payment and thus it is on a zero-sum game with the client. 
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Once the client knows about the true costs of the changes, it will negotiate out most of it. 
Therefore the vendor has strong incentive to hide information of the real costs of the 
client and leverage the information asymmetry. Thus frictions happen. Low-powered CP 
and T&M contracts are not stringent on the initial setup of the contract because the 
client’s willingness to pay for overrun eases the pressure on the vendor to fall back on a 
complete description. They often feature lower level of contract completeness. The 
literature has shown that the CP and T&M contracts perform better to mitigate high 
negotiation costs because it has higher flexibility for change with incomplete initial 
design of the contract (Baraji and Tadelis 2002). Thus when renegotiation is needed, first 
the costs for contracting are lower. Moreover, as the client and the vendor’s incentives 
are aligned through cost sharing (CP) or the vendor does not have the need to conceal 
information (T&M), the frictions from renegotiation reduce.  Therefore we prospose: 
H5: When perceived negotiation costs are higher, firms are more likely to select 
contracts with higher flexibility for changes. 
Coordination costs are the costs of managing interdependence (Malone and 
Crowston, 1994). The literature has documented that the concern of high coordination 
costs is equally important for firms to consider outsourcing as TCE-based transaction 
costs (Gulati and Singh 1998). Coordination costs can also be more effectively managed 
within a firm (insourcing) rather than through contractual relationship. Within an 
organization, coordination is implemented through the command structure and authority 
system of the organizational hierarchy. There are established operating procedures, 
command structure and authority systems that are key for task coordination. Also the firm 
hierarchy clarifies boundaries and decisions on activities and thus facilitates decision 
 48
making (Galbraith 1977). Thus conventionally one would expect firms to prefer contracts 
that allow more buyer’s control and administration and the vendor to work more like a 
“unit” of the firm. T&M and CP contracts that bear a high portion of risk and costs of the 
transaction work in that way.  
We argue that the client tends to implement FP contracts for transactions with 
higher expected coordination costs. The interdependence is the cause of coordination 
costs. This cause does not disappear even when the process is under the firm’s control; 
only the consequent coordination problems may be alleviated to certain level. According 
to modular systems theory, the interdependence, or less modular design restricts the 
firms’ ability to organize or reorganize business activities within a network of suppliers 
and buyers to achieve cost savings, access capabilities and adapt to environment changes 
(Sanchez and Mahoney 1996, Schilling & Steensma 2001). Thus firms with high 
interdependence among its business processes may first seek to improve their modular 
design before the execution of the business process by the vendor. When outsourcing a 
process with lower mo2qdularity, there will be two phases in the outsourcing 
relationship: modularizing the process and delivering the process. Tanriverdi et al. (2007) 
suggested that firms may focus on modularization tasks when selecting sourcing 
mechanisms and thus use offshoring/outsourcing initiative to take advantage of vendors’ 
capabilities of modularizing processes. We made a similar assumption that firms would 
select contract types to facilitate modularization tasks when coordination costs are higher.  
Firms can use FP contracts to facilitate modularization tasks and save costs. First, 
modularization needs to document, redesign, improve and standardize business processes. 
These tasks require intensive time and incentives to clarify and understand the details of 
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execution of the target process and its relationships with other processes. FP contracts 
demand a highly complete design when the parties sign the contract because the vendor 
has to rely on detailed description of tasks and expectations to avoid unexpected changes. 
Thus the vendor has the incentive to fully document the process execution and 
performance requirements. Second, the vendor signing FP contracts also has incentive to 
redesign and standardize the process. The payment schedule of a FP contract hinges on 
detailed performance specifications and the vendor has greater incentive to save costs. By 
clarifying well-defined input, output and performance specifications in the initial design 
effort, the vendor can expect fewer uncertainties with its payment in the future. To save 
costs of communication and information sharing, the vendor tends to standardize the 
interfaces between other processes. T&M contractors, on the other hand, have less 
concern of costs because the client will bear whatever additional costs. Third, a third 
party may be preferred to deal with a complex problem that involves different internal 
departments. It is difficult for firm for different processes (departments) to work together 
for changes because they have their own organizational objectives and interests and their 
agendas may not always come together. External forces that have strong incentives for 
changes may drive internal departments to face the changes. T&M contractors work like 
another “unit” of the client under the same umbrella do not have the incentive to force 
changes on internal departments. Therefore we propose:  
H6: When perceived coordination costs are higher, firms are more likely to select 
contract with higher incentive to save costs and more document efforts.  
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Chapter 6 Data and Methodology 
6.1. THE CHOICE OF SOURCING MECHANISMS 
6.1.1. Sample and Data 
We test our hypotheses using survey data from 93 medium and large US firms. 
The survey is to collect data on firms’ choice of sourcing mechanisms and characteristics 
of business processes. Validated measures and scales were adapted from the prior 
literature to the extent possible. Multiple items were developed based on the theoretical 
foundations and definitions of the new constructs. Face and content validity of the 
measures were assessed and improved through iterative interviews and pre-tests with six 
academic experts, two senior IT executives, seven IT managers, and MBA students who 
were knowledgeable about outsourcing and offshoring decisions of firms. 
The sampling frame for this study was medium and large sized US firms. From a 
purchased directory of company executives with corresponding company information, 
2000 firms that have more than 1000 employees were randomly selected. To ensure 
variance in the types of business processes surveyed, the sample was divided into three 
sub-samples respectively targeting the marketing, finance, and IT functions of firms. 
Paper copies of the surveys were sent to senior executives of the functional areas. A 
password protected online version of the survey was also made available for 
convenience. Recommendations for increasing survey response rates were followed 
(Dillman 2000). Two follow-up reminders were sent at the second and fourth week of the 
original mailing. However, this approach returned only 23 responses, a response rate of 
about 1%. The return letters and follow-up phone calls indicated three major reasons for 
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the low response rate. First, some firms did not have any major business process 
outsourcing or offshoring experience to report on. This indicates that the outsourcing and 
offshoring of business processes may not have diffused as widely as suggested by the 
press. Thus, a random sampling approach may not be appropriate. Second, firms that had 
outsourcing or offshoring experience were already overwhelmed with requests for 
participation in similar surveys. This is a well acknowledged problem in survey research. 
However, the problem was aggravated by a third reason: due to the public’s fierce 
emotional objection to offshoring decisions of firms, many firms wanted to keep their 
sourcing decisions confidential and had strict policies against participating in surveys 
related to this topic. 
The lessons learned from the “random sample” prompted a change in the 
sampling strategy of this study. We reasoned that confidentiality would be less of an 
issue for a “targeted sample” of firms whose sourcing initiatives are already in the public 
domain. An extensive search on news wires and labor union websites that track 
outsourcing and offshoring activities of firms produced a targeted sample of 592 firms. 
The survey was sent to senior executives of those firms. Our school’s alumni who work 
in those firms also assisted us in following up with the executives and convincing them to 
complete and return the surveys. This approach resulted in 70 responses, a response rate 
of about 12%. Titles of the respondents indicate that in some firms, senior executives 
such as the President, CEO, and Vice Presidents responded to the survey. In majority of 
firms, the respondents held senior manager positions closer to the business process under 
investigation: e.g., Senior Manager of Customer Service, Associate Brand Manager, 
Director of Marketing, Finance Manager, Director, Capital Markets, Financial Controller, 
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IT Director, Lead Information Architect, Manager of Software Development, and so 
forth. On average, the respondents had been involved with the sourcing decisions of their 
firms’ business processes for 3.23 years. This evidence indicates that we were able to 
reach the intended respondents and that the respondents were reasonably competent to 
answer our survey questions. 
A comparison between the random sample of 2000 firms and the 70 respondents 
from the targeted sample indicate that the second group of firms are significantly larger in 
terms of number of employees (t=-2.38, p<0.05) and revenues (t=-2.49, p< 0.05). This 
finding confirms our expectation that larger firms are more likely to engage in 
outsourcing and offshoring of business processes.  Further independent t-tests comparing 
the 23 respondents from the first phase of data collection with the 70 respondents from 
the second phase did not reveal any statistically significant differences along the number 
of employees (t=1.02, p>0.1) or revenues (t=0.22, p>0.1), indicating that the respondents 
to the first phase were also large firms. Characteristics of the business processes of the 
two groups are not statistically different along key explanatory variables of this study 
such as unbundling readiness (t=-1.52, p>0.1), IT-business coupling (t=-1.05, p>0.1), 
human capital specificity (t=0.93, p>0.1), or cost reduction (t=1.01, p>0.1) and quality 
improvement (t=-1.20, p>0.1) intentions. The only major difference is in intellectual 
capital specificity of the processes (t=2.71, p<0.01). Overall, the 23 respondents from the 
first phase and the 70 respondents from the second phase exhibit similar profiles. Thus, 
we pooled them together to obtain a total sample of 93 responses. The breakdown of 
participating firms by industry is as follows: mineral (1.08%), Manufacturing (35.48%), 
Transportation, Communication and Utilities (16.13%), Retail (2.15%), Finance, 
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Insurance and Real Estate (11.83%), Service (23.66%), Other (9.68%). More details of 
responding company profile is shown in Table 2. 
Five cases were dropped since they had significant missing data (3) or they used 
hybrid sourcing mechanisms (2). Four firms offshored business processes to advanced 
countries: U.K., Germany, Italy and Hong Kong. Since our theory assumes significant 
production cost differentials across the source and destination countries, we checked if 
cost reduction was a motivation in these cases. In two of the cases, it was. Thus, we kept 
them in the sample. As for the remaining two cases, we did robustness checks by 
dropping them or keeping them in the sample. The results remained the same. To 
maintain a higher sample size, we kept those cases. The final sample retained for the 
analyses includes 88 cases. 
6.1.2 Variables 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the choice of sourcing mechanisms, a nominal variable 
containing four categories: (1) domestic insourcing, (2) domestic outsourcing, (3) 
offshore insourcing, and (4) offshore outsourcing. We also included an “other” category 
in the survey to capture hybrid sourcing mechanisms or collaborative governance 
mechanisms such as joint ventures and strategic partnerships. As explained above, two 
out of 93 cases, who marked the “other” category and indicated hybrid sourcing 
mechanisms, were excluded from the analyses. 
Explanatory variables 
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Table 3 summarizes definitions, measurement items, and supporting literatures of 
the explanatory constructs of this study. 
Independent variables 
Business process modularity (MOD):  The measures of this construct are 
grounded in the modular systems theory (Baldwin and Clark 1997; Garud et al. 2003; 
Malhotra et al. 2005) and the literatures on product/process life cycle and maturity 
(Anderson and Zeithaml 1984; Harter et al. 2000; Benner and Tushman 2002; CMMI 
2002). 
Business process IT detachability (ITD): The measures for this construct were 
adapted from the literature on coupling between IT and work process strategies (Mitchell 
and Zmud 1999), and loosely versus tightly coupled systems (Orton and Weick 1990). 
Control variables 
As we discuss in the literature review, there are other research streams identifying 
characteristics of a business process that may affect the choice of sourcing mechanism. 
To rule out major alternative explanations for firms’ choice, we control for those process 
characteristics identified in the literature. We also include process and firm level control 
variables that may have an impact on firms’ choice while are related to independent 
variables. 
Process level controls: Business process human capital specificity (HCS): It is 
defined as the extent to which human skills, knowledge and understanding associated 
with a business process are firm specific and non transferrable to other uses (Williamson 
1979; Anderson 1985; 1985). A review of the rich literature on HCS (Rindfleisch and 
Heide 1997) recommends the use of HCS measures developed and validated in Anderson 
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(1985). We adapted four items from the scales in Anderson (1985) and Anderson and 
Schmittlein (1984). 
Business process intellectual capital specificity (ICS): The measures for this 
construct were adapted from validated measures of asset specificity (Stump and Heide 
1996) and codified knowledge and intangible assets (Zander and Kogut 1995). 
Business process strategic criticality (SC): The RBV of the firm implies that 
strategically critical processes ought to be kept in house (domestic insource or offshore 
insource). Thus, we control for strategic criticality of the business process under 
consideration. Drawing from the RBV, we measure strategic criticality of a business 
process by measuring the extent to which it is valuable to the firm, rare among the firm’s 
competitors, and difficult to substitute and imitate by competitors (Barney 1991). 
Cost reduction and quality improvement intents:  Cost reduction and quality 
improvement are two of the most commonly cited intents in outsourcing or offshoring 
business processes (Ang and Straub 1998; DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani 1998; Quinn 
1999). Thus, we control for them. 
Types of process: Our sample contains both IT and non-IT business processes. 
Examples of IT processes in our sample are: IT operations monitoring, extended service 
help desk, application development, testing, and support, and data processing. Examples 
of non-IT processes in our sample are: supply chain management, operations and 
production support, R&D, product development and launch strategy, architectural design 
& construction, payroll, human resource services, customer service call centers, sales 
support, financial planning & analysis, accounts payable and receivable, tax compliance 
and filing, and marketing communications. Since IT outsourcing and offshoring have 
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been in practice significantly longer than business process sourcing, vendors may have 
reached more maturity in the delivery of IT processes. To account for this effect, we use a 
dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 for IT processes and 0 otherwise5.  
Firm level controls: Firm's strategic risk (SR): The outsourcing and offshoring 
initiative can expose a firm to strategic risks such as losses in financial health, 
competitive position, and market share (Barki and Rivard 1993; Barki et al. 2001). 
Firm's strategic intent (SI): Firms can use sourcing mechanisms for strategic 
intents such as entry into new markets, access to technologies and skilled personnel, and 
reduction of time-to-market of products (DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani 1998; Quinn 1999; 
Goo et al. 2000). We use dummy variables to capture and control for strategic intent of 
firms. 
Firm’s experience with sourcing mechanisms: Firms that have prior experience 
with a particular sourcing mechanism may be more likely to adopt that mechanism. We 
use dummy variables to control whether a firm has prior experience with domestic 
outsourcing (0=No; 1=Yes) and with offshore outsourcing (0=No; 1=Yes). 
Perceived coordination and negotiation costs: One of the key assumptions of 
TCE is that asset characteristics, such as the process characteristics identified in this 
study, impact transactions costs, and hence, the choice of governance mechanism. 
However, the majority of empirical TCE-based studies use the transaction cost logic only 
                                                 
5 As part of our robustness checks, we repeated the analyses using a richer process classification scheme 
based on Porter’s value chain: (a) Supply chain & operations processes; (b) Human resource processes; (c) 
Financial & Accounting processes; (d) Marketing & Sales processes; (e) Service processes; and (f) 
Information systems processes. We defined (f) IT processes as the base case. All dummies capturing the 
non-IT process types in a, b, c, d, and e, are significant, indicating that there are significant differences in 
sourcing choices for IT and non-IT processes. Since the results are qualitatively the same, for parsimony, 
we use the simple classification scheme capturing IT versus non-IT processes.  
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to justify their nomological links. They do not explicitly measure the costs. Nevertheless, 
to be able to validate our assumption that process characteristics do indeed impact 
transaction costs, we include two perceptual measures of transaction costs, namely 
coordination costs (Keller 1994; Ang and Straub 1998) and negotiation costs (Artz and 
Brush 2000; Simester and Knez 2002). 
6.1.3. Measurement properties of constructs 
Table 4 reports purified measurement items, factor loadings and reliabilities of the 
multi-item constructs of this study. An item purification process examined theoretical 
significance of the items, item-to-total correlations, and contributions of items to scale 
reliabilities. Exploratory factor analysis was also used to assess if any items failed to load 
on a factor that it was expected to measure. Items marked as “dropped” in Table 4 are 
eliminated either because they failed to converge on the factor they intended to measure, 
or they were highly noisy and reduced the overall reliability of the corresponding 
measurement scale. With the items remaining after these procedures, Cronbach’s alpha 
values of all constructs are above the recommended threshold level of 0.70 (Nunnally 
1978), indicating sufficient reliability, especially for the newly developed constructs. IT 
detachability construct had only two items remaining after this process. Although two 
items are less than the three-item rule of thumb suggested for established constructs, 
considering that this is a new construct that is developed for the first time in this study, 
and that the two items exhibit an Alpha level of 0.74, the two-item construct satisfies the 
reliability requirements (Nunnally 1978). Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used 
to assess convergent and discriminant validity of the multi-item constructs. Table 1 
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shows that items have high loadings within the constructs they were designed to capture, 
and low loadings across the other constructs, which respectively provide evidence of 
convergent and discriminant validity. 
We also compare different measurement models for the process modularity 
construct. Based on our conceptualization, process modularity could be a reflective 
second-order factor measurement model comprising of two first-order constructs:  
modularity and maturity/standardization. In deciding why it ought to be a reflective rather 
than a formative second-order construct, we followed the guidance provided by Jarvis et 
al. (2003). According to our theory, a firm desiring to increase process modularity of a 
process ought to increase modularity and maturity/standardization levels of the process. 
Thus, the direction of causality is from the process modularity construct to its first-order 
dimensions. Further, the measurement items we developed share a common theme. They 
mutually support and co-vary with each other. These criteria indicate that a reflective 
second-order model is the appropriate choice for this construct. However, with only two 
first-order dimensions, a second-order factor model cannot be identified. To overcome 
this problem, we introduced a criterion variable into the model to assess the measurement 
model. The Target Coefficient (T=0.95) indicates that the second-order factor model is 
superior to a correlated first-order factors model. Next, we sought to include this 
measurement model in the multinomial logit choice model in structural equation 
modeling (SEM) analysis. However, the SEM framework does not provide the 
implementation of a multinomial logit choice equation in the equation systems. Thus, the 
rich second-order measurement scheme of the process modularity construct had to be 
reduced to a single item measure for use in the multinomial logit analyses. We derived 
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the single item measure by taking a weighted average of the measurement items using the 
first-order and second-order factor loadings as weights6. 
6.1.4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics and correlations among the constructs. 
Descriptive statistics indicate that 68% of the firms in our sample have prior experience 
with domestic outsourcing whereas 43% have prior experience with offshore outsourcing. 
Of the business processes covered in the sample, 28% are IT, 72% are non-IT processes. 
Perceived strategic criticality of these business processes is relatively low (Mean strategic 
criticality = 2.47 out of 7). Perceived risk in changing the sourcing mechanism for these 
processes is also relatively low (Mean strategic risk = 2.7 out of 7). The intent for seeking 
an alternative sourcing mechanism is to reduce cost for 78.4% of firms, and to improve 
quality for 64% of firms. 
In line with our theoretical expectations, process modularity is negatively 
associated with coordination (r=-0.375, p<0.01) and negotiation costs (r=-0.436, p<0.01). 
Similarly, IT detachability is negatively associated with coordination costs (r=-0.280, 
p<0.05). These findings provide evidence of nomological validity for our new constructs. 
The correlation between process modularity and IT detachability is not significant (r=-
0.016, p>0.1). It suggests that the modularity among processes does not ensure the 
detachability of the process from IT infrastructure. Along with the results of confirmatory 
factor analysis in Table 3, this evidence indicates that process modularity and IT 
detachability are two distinct constructs. 
                                                 
6 When a formative rather than a reflective second-order factor model is used as the basis for this reduction, 
the correlations between the two alternative single item measures of process modularity is highly 
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6.1.5. Model Specification 
The dependent variable, the sourcing choice, has four categories: domestic 
insourcing, domestic outsourcing, offshore insourcing, offshore outsourcing. To our 
knowledge, there is no theory arguing for or against the presence of inherent ordering of 
appropriateness or other criteria among these categories. There is no universally best 
sourcing mechanism for any random business process. If researchers are not certain about 
whether the choice categories are ordered or not, it is better to use a model with weaker 
assumptions, i.e. the unordered multinomial logit model (Leclere 1999). If the true model 
is unordered, the use of an ordered model can result in biased estimates of probabilities of 
choice. Vice versa, the loss would be the inefficiency of using incomplete information 
(Long 1997). Whenever the ordinality of the dependent variable is in doubt, the loss of 
efficiency in a nominal model is outweighed by avoiding potential bias in an ordered 
model (Long 1997). Thus we tend to adopt unordered model in our analysis. A 
multinomial logit (MNLG) specification is appropriate for nominal choice variables 
whose categories are more than two and unordered. 
MNLG model is based on random utility model that links a vector of explanatory 
variables to a decision maker’s probability of choosing a choice category (McFadden 
1974). Specifically, let  ijU be firm i ’s utility for choosing the sourcing mechanism j , 
{ }1, ,i i iKX x x= K  be the vector of explanatory variables (including business process 
characteristics and controls) for firm i , { }1, ,j j jKβ β β= K  be the vector of the 
corresponding coefficient estimates for sourcing mechanism j , and ijP be firm i ’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
significant (r=0.95, p<0.001). Multinomial logit results are qualitatively the same across the two measures. 
 61
probability of choosing the sourcing mechanism j , where 1, ,i N= K , and j = 1,.., J. In 
this study, 88=N , 4J = , and 14=K . Then:  
1
, 1, , , 1, , .KTij i j ij jk ik ijkU X e x e i N j Jβ β== + = + ∀ = =∑ K K  
1) 
The probability of firm i  making choice j is (McFadden 1974):  
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2) 
To identify the model, the set of coefficients for one choice category needs to be 
restricted to 0 and used as the “base choice” or the “reference choice”. For example, if we 
select category 1 as the reference choice, then: 
'' 2
exp( )




ij i i J T
i jj
X




= = = ∀ =+∑ K , and  3) 
1
'' 2
1Pr( 1| ) , 1, ,
1 exp( )
i i i J T
i jj
P y X i N
X β=
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choice 1. 
 
The model estimates 31 =−J groups of coefficients for the choice categories 
other than the reference choice. The coefficients capture the effects of the independent 
variables on the odds that a firm chooses any choice j  ( 2, ,j J= K ) relative to the 
reference choice. In other words: 
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4) 
The sign and magnitudes of the coefficients can be interpreted for the direction 
and magnitude of the effects of explanatory variables on the odds of choosing a choice 
category relative to the reference choice. A unit change in  ikx  ( 1, ,k K= K ) affects the 
odds of choosing category j  relative to the choice of the reference choice by a factor 
of ( )exp jkβ . If 0<jkβ , the odds of choosing j decreases because ( )exp 1jkβ < . 
Multicollinearity statistics are not ready output from MNLG models as OLS 
models. To test the presence of potential multicollinearity problems, we introduced a 
pseudo dependent variable (coordination costs) to run an OLS regression. As 
multicollinearity arise from the relationships among independent variables and irrelevant 
to the choice of dependent variable, this approach should be able to detect 
multicollinearity problems in our model. The OLS regression revealed that the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) values range from 1.24 to 1.78, all below the cut-off value of 10. 
Thus we are confident that there are no significant multicollinearity problems in our data. 
6.2. THE CHOICE OF CONTRACT TYPES 
6.2.1. Sample and data 
The data collection process includes two stages. There was a learning process for 
the first stage data collection. We have developed a model to establish relationship 
between business process characteristics and sourcing choices based on the first stage 
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sample in the first essay. For details of the sample, please refer to the sample and 
methodology part in the first essay.  
As we feel the need for a larger sample size for more reliable results, we started a 
new stage of data collection for the research on contract choice. Based on the lessons we 
learned in the first stage, we 1) refined and shortened the survey for more focused 
information and developed a more interactive survey website; 2) approach a targeted 
sample – members of the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) directly through 
emails. We also tested the validity of building the second stage survey on the basis of 
first stage survey content. If the second stage data is consistent with the first stage, the 
choice of sourcing mechanism model validated in the first stage should fit reasonably 
well with the data. Using a pilot sample collected in the second stage, we tested whether 
the first stage model gave reliable predictions for the choice of sourcing mechanisms for 
cases in the second stage. Out of the first nine survey results, the first stage choice model 
made six correct predictions. We then proceeded with more confidence to collect more 
data with similar survey content. We had an email list of 5000 members of ISM. Most of 
them are professionals who are interested in supply chain management from various 
industries (excluding 27 respondents from universities). Their titles range from buyer to 
supply chain manager to chief operations officer to president. We excluded buyer and 
other lower level contacts, resulting in a list of 3742. After the first invitation, two 
follow-up emails were sent out. We got 28 direct rejections for various reasons such as 
company policy, not being relevant or no time. The number of responses we got after 
about 4 months is 104, which is a response rate of 2.8%. Excluding one record that has 
high data missing rate, we got a sample of 103. Combining the 88 cases from the first 
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stage, we have got a total of 191 data points. As we focus only on choices of domestic 
insourcing, domestic outsourcing and offshore outsourcing, we tend to exclude the 
records of offshore insourcing (11) and other hybrid sourcing mechanisms (9). It results a 
sample of 171. 
To be comfortable combining the sample from the two stages, we perform two 
tests for differences between the two samples. First, independent t-test shows that there is 
no significant difference in average revenues (t=0.72, p>0.1), indicating average sizes of 
companies in the two stages converge. Second, t-tests indicated differences to some 
extent in business characteristics in two stages (Maturity (t=0.38, p>0.1), Modularity 
(t=1.91, p>0.05), human capital specificity (t=3.76, p<0.01), IT detachability (t=1.84, 
p>0.05)). We suspect that process type may be the cause as the types of business 
processes include obviously more supply chain/procurement management processes in 
the second stage. After we controlled for the effect of process type (first regressing 
characteristic variables on process type – supply chain/procure vs. others and then 
performing t-test for the residuals), there is no significant difference between the business 
process characteristic variable in the two stages (human capital specificity (t=1.23, 
p>0.1), Modularity (t=0.37, p>0.1), IT detachability (t=0.42, p>0.1)). Thus overall we are 
confident performing analysis on the combined sample.  
6.2.2 Variables 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the choice of contract types, a nominal variable 
containing three categories: (1) FP, (2) CP, and (3) T&M, with FP coded as the lowest 
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ordered contract type in the dataset. Different from the sourcing choice, there is an 
inherent order for the three types of contracts. As shown in Table 7, the level of risk and 
incentive for cost reduction decreases from FP, CP to T&M for the vendor, but the level 
of savings on negotiation costs increases from FP, CP to T&M. Thus the dependent 
variable is a group of ordered discrete choice. 
Independent variables 
Table 8 summarizes definitions, measurement items, and supporting literatures of 
the explanatory constructs of this study. 
Perceived negotiation costs: Negotiation costs measure the difficulty and haggling 
of negotiation and renegotiation for detailed description of requirements when changes 
happen and adaptation is needed. The measurement items were adapted from Artz and 
Brush (2000) and Simester and Knez (2002). 
Perceived coordination cost: Coordination costs measure the costs of information 
sharing, task coordination and shared decision making between the client and the vendor. 
The measurement items were adapted from Keller (1994) and Ang and Straub (1998). 
The process characteristics are theorized to impact the negotiation and 
coordination costs. Thus the first-stage estimation includes these characteristics as 
independent variables. 
Business process maturity (MAT):  The measures were adapted from the 
literatures on product/process life cycle and maturity (Anderson and Zeithaml 1984; 
Harter et al. 2000; Benner and Tushman 2002; CMMI 2002). 
Business process modularity (MOD): The measures of this construct are grounded 
in the modular systems theory (Baldwin and Clark 1997; Garud et al. 2003; Malhotra et 
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al. 2005). In this study, process maturity and modularity are differentiated from each 
other. 
The following characteristics are the same as those in the analysis of the choice of 
sourcing mechanisms: Business process IT detachability (ITD), Business process human 
capital specificity (HCS): and Business process intellectual capital specificity (ICS).  
Controls for the impact of BP characteristics on Contracting Costs 
Business process strategic criticality (SC): Strategically critical processes are 
often deeply embedded in the historical and social structures of the firm and full of tacit 
knowledge. Coordination may be costly as tacit knowledge is difficult to communicate 
and embeddedness requires the vendor for in-depth understanding of the client beyond 
the process per se. Negotiation costs may increase as well because it may be difficult to 
describe such a process and involve uncertainties. We use the same measures as those in 
the choice of sourcing mechanism analysis.  
Types of process: Our sample contains both IT and non-IT business processes. 
Examples of IT processes in our sample are: IT operations monitoring, extended service 
help desk, application development, testing, and support, and data processing. Examples 
of non-IT processes in our sample are: supply chain management, operations and 
production support, R&D, product development and launch strategy, architectural design 
& construction, payroll, human resource services, customer service call centers, sales 
support, financial planning & analysis, accounts payable and receivable, tax compliance 
and filing, and marketing communications. Since IT outsourcing has been in practice 
significantly longer than BP outsourcing, the coordination and negotiation costs may be 
different as firms may have better understanding and expectations of how IT outsourcing 
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work. Moreover, IT processes often involves advanced technology component and thus 
are subject to higher uncertainties and changes (Gulati and Singh 1998). To account for 
this effect, we use a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 for IT processes and 0 
otherwise. As we described in the sample section, supply chain/procurement management 
processes are significantly different from other type of processes in certain business 
process characteristics. Thus we need to control for it too. 
Controls for Contract Choice Model 
Cost reduction and quality improvement intents:  Different contract types provide 
different incentives to save costs, but the same incentive may decrease firms’ incentive to 
improve quality (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). Thus the extent to which firms’ are 
eager to save costs or improve quality may impact firms’ contract choice. Thus, we 
control for them. 
Firm's strategic intent (SI): Firms intended for strategic benefits such as entry into 
new markets, access to technologies and skilled personnel, and reduction of time-to-
market of products (DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani 1998; Quinn 1999; Goo et al. 2000) 
when considering outsourcing. These intents may shift firms’ preference for a certain 
type of contract. For instance, if the client is eager to reduce time-to-market using the 
vendor’s capabilities, it may consider less about saving costs but more about evolving 
with the vendor when uncertainties happen. Thus T&M or CP may be better choice than 
FP contracts. We use dummy variables to capture and control for strategic intent of firms. 
Other Controls 
Firm’s experience with sourcing mechanisms: Firms that have prior experience 
with a particular sourcing mechanism may be more likely to adopt that mechanism. We 
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use this control in the model of estimating the choice of sourcing mechanisms, not 
contract choice. We use dummy variables to control whether a firm has prior experience 
with domestic outsourcing (0=No; 1=Yes) and with offshore outsourcing (0=No; 1=Yes). 
6.2.3. Measurement properties of constructs 
Table 9 reports purified measurement items, factor loadings and reliabilities of the 
multi-item constructs of this study. We used a similar item purification process as 
described in the first study. Items marked as “dropped” in Table 9 are eliminated either 
because they failed to converge on the factor they intended to measure, or they were 
highly noisy and reduced the overall reliability of the corresponding measurement scale. 
With the items remaining after these procedures, Cronbach’s alpha values of all 
constructs are above the recommended threshold level of 0.70 (Nunnally 1978), 
indicating sufficient reliability, especially for the newly developed constructs. IT 
detachability construct had only two items remaining after this process. Although two 
items are less than the three-item rule of thumb suggested for established constructs, 
considering that this is a new construct that is developed for the first time in this study, 
and that the two items exhibit an Alpha level of 0.74, the two-item construct satisfies the 
reliability requirements (Nunnally 1978). Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used 
to assess convergent and discriminant validity of the multi-item constructs. Table 9 
shows that items have high loadings within the constructs they were designed to capture, 
and low loadings across the other constructs, which respectively provide evidence of 
convergent and discriminant validity. 
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6.2.4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 10 presents descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables. In line 
with our theoretical analysis, business process characteristics are correlated with 
coordination and negotiation costs. Process maturity is negatively associated with 
negotiation costs (r=-0.242, p<0.01) while process modularity is negatively associated 
with coordination costs (r=-0.250, p<0.01) and negotiation costs (r=-0.217, p<0.01). In 
accordance with TCE literature, human capital specificity is positively associated with 
coordination and negotiation costs. That human capital specificity is negatively 
associated with process maturity (r=-0.254, p<0.01) and modularity (r=-0.277, p<0.01) 
indicates firm specific business processes tend to be less mature and modular than non-
specific processes, which may be exposed more to standardization.   
6.2.5 Model specifications 
We estimate the effect of process characteristics on negotiation and coordination 
costs and the effect of the costs on contract choices using a two-stage model. The system 







The first-stage models are specified in Equation (2) and (3), which are OLS 
estimation of business characteristics on negotiation and coordination costs. Equation (1) 
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gives the second-stage choice model. As the dependent variable is inherently ordered, we 
adopted an ordered probit model (Zavoina and McKelvey 1975). The equation group (1) 
shows the model specification. The contract choice is assumed to be built around a latent 
variable  that measures firms’ concerns of incentive, risk and negotiation 
costs and is determined by a vector of independent variables . When the concerns of 
renegotiation costs reach certain level, we could observe to choose contracts with higher 
level of flexibility, say T&M. Similarly, if the concerns of risk sharing and incentive are 
getting higher, the outside observation may be the firm choosing fixed price contract. We 
normalize the cut-off values for the latent variable as 0 and   . When , the 
observed choice is 1;  leads to Choice 2 and  shows Choice 3. Given 
 is normally distributed, the probability of choosing each contract type is shown in 
Group (1).  
The system can be estimated using a two-stage method. Our model is different 
from two-stage least square method (2SLS) because we have a probability model that 
should be estimated with maximum likelihood method.  Thus we used two-step 
maximum likelihood estimation method (Wooldridge 2002, p242). We first estimate 
equations (2) and (3), get the predicted values of negotiation and coordination costs, plug 
them into the likelihood function of (1), the probit model and solve the maximum 
likelihood problem:   to get the estimates. According to 
Wooldridge (2002), the estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal.  
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6.2.6 Accounting for Selection Bias 
As we mentioned before, the contract choice can only be observed after firms 
decide to outsource. The sample of contract choice is censored. It is possible that the 
choice of sourcing mechanisms and the contract choice are jointly determined. Thus the 
estimates of the contract choice model with the censored sample may be biased. 
Heckman (1979) proposed a two-stage procedure to account for selection bias problems 
such as women wage estimation (the wage data can only be observed if the woman 
chooses to work). Our situation is a little bit different because the selection function in 
Heckman’s model is binary while our selection of sourcing mechanism has three 
categories.  
There are several proposed methods to correct selection bias of multinomial 
choices (Lee 1983; Dahl 2002; Dubin and McFadden 1984). We adopt Lee (1983)’s 
method based on the findings by Bourguignon et al. (2004) that Lee’s method performs 
better with small samples and Dubin and McFadden’s method is superior for larger 
samples (>500). As our sample, the contract choices for firms choosing outsourcing 
mechanisms, remains 87 observations, we went for Lee’s method. 
Lee’s method extends Heckman model to incorporate multinomial logit model for 
the sample selection function. Specifically our case of the choice of sourcing mechanism 
is modeled as: 
 
The sourcing mechanisms include domestic insourcing (1), domestic outsourcing (2) and 
offshore outsourcing (3). The vector  contains variables that determine the choice of 
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sourcing mechanisms. Since Equation (1) can only be observed when SourcingChoice 
equals 2 and 3, we need to account for the impact of the probability of choosing these 
mechanisms on the contract choice. According to Lee (1983), we can include correction 
terms of the two observable choices into Equation (1) as variables and achieve unbiased 
estimation of . The calculation of the correction terms are based on the results of the 
MNGL model. Namely, for SourcingChoice 2, the correction term is 
, where  is the density function of standard normal 
distribution and  is the inverse of the cumulative probability function of standard 
normal. We leveraged this method to estimate the contract choice model without 
selection bias. We used the MNGL model proposed in the first study. 
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Chapter 7 Result and Analysis 
7.1. RESULTS FOR THE CHOICE OF SOURCING MECHANISMS 
Table 6 reports the findings of MNLG analysis of the choice of sourcing 
mechanism. Column [1] presents the likelihood ratio tests for each independent variable 
in the model. Column [2], [3], and [4a] give the coefficient estimates of each choice 
relative to reference choice “domestic insourcing”. Column [4b] presents the coefficient 
estimates of choice “offshore insourcing” when we lower the number of variables for the 
choice for robustness checking of the model. Pair-wise comparison between offshore 
outsourcing and domestic outsourcing (by changing the reference case) is listed in 
Column [5]. The model statistics reported at the bottom of Table 6 indicate good model 
fit. Model Chi-square is highly significant (χ2=115.07, df=42, p<0.001). Cox and Snell 
Pseudo R2 is 0.731. Further, the model correctly classifies 74% of the observed sourcing 
decisions. 
The tests in Column [1] establish the significant impact of the independent 
variables on the choice of sourcing mechanisms. To test whether a variable kx has 
significant effect on the choice of sourcing mechanism, the null hypothesis is that all the 
three coefficients (one for each choice except the reference case) are simultaneously 
equal to zero 0: 321 === kkkoH βββ  (Long 1997). The difference between -2 log-
likelihood of the full model, which includes all of the variables and that of a restricted 
model, which excludes the variable under consideration measures the variable’s effect 
statistically. Significant statistic indicates that the variable has significant impact on the 
choice of sourcing mechanism. The chi-sqaure statistic in column [1] indicate that 
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process modularity (χ2=13.2, df=3, p < 0.01) and IT detachability (χ2=6.484, df=3, p < 
0.05) have significant effect on the choice of sourcing mechanism. H1 and H2 are 
supported. We also found support for the effect of TCE-related characteristics human 
capital specificity (χ2=21.9, df=3, p < 0.001), and intellectual capital specificity 
(χ2=7.468, df=3, p < 0.05) similar to what has been found in the literature. Such support 
lends nomological validity to our model. 
The coefficients and odds effects in Column [2], [3], and [5] indicate how the 
likelihood of choosing one outsourcing relative to the reference case changes in direction 
and magnitude as a variable change. Changing the reference case does not affect the 
model features, but provide additional information for different pair-wise comparisons. 
Column [2], [3] and [5] compare the likelihoods of choosing domestic outsourcing and 
offshore outsourcing relative to domestic insourcing and offshore outsourcing relative to 
domestic outsourcing. While lower process modularity leads to lower likelihood of 
selecting domestic outsourcing over domestic insourcing (Beta=0.896, p<0.1; odds 
effect=2.449), the likelihood of selecting offshore outsourcing over domestic insourcing 
increases as process modularity decreases (Beta=-0.841, p<0.1; odds effect=0.431). The 
preference to the two types of outsourcing mechanisms goes to different directions 
relative to domestic insourcing as process modularity changes. The comparison between 
offshore outsourcing and domestic outsourcing consistently shows that the likelihood of 
selecting offshore outsourcing over domestic outsourcing strongly increases as process 
modularity gets lower (Beta=-1.737, p<0.01; odds effect=0.176).  Thus, H1a, H1b, and 
H1c are supported. As shown in Column [2] and [5], ITD is negatively associated with 
the likelihood of choosing domestic outsourcing relative to domestic insourcing (Beta=-
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0.751, p<0.05; odds effect=0.472), but positively associated with the likelihood of 
choosing offshore outsourcing relative to domestic outsourcing (Beta=0.969, p<0.05; 
odds effect=2.635). Thus H2a and H2b are supported. 
Findings in control variables reveal some interesting patterns in BPO 
phenomenon too. The effect of TCE-related human capital specificity is consistent with 
the literature that higher human capital specificity makes firms less likely to choose 
domestic outsourcing over domestic insourcing (Beta=-1.396, p<0.01; odds 
effect=0.248). Its significant positive association with the likelihood of selecting offshore 
outsourcing over domestic outsourcing (Beta=1.146, p<0.05; odds effect=3.146) suggests 
that offshore outsourcing should be classified as a different sourcing mechanism from 
domestic outsourcing. The results also reveal that firms are less likely to choose offshore 
outsourcing over domestic outsourcing when intellectual capital specificity is higher 
(Beta=-0.734, p<0.05; odds effect=0.480). Firms are strongly in more favor of offshore 
outsourcing when they intend to reduce cost (Beta=3.703, p<0.01; odds effect=40.562 for 
offshore outsourcing vs. domestic insourcing and Beta=4.837, p<0.01; odds 
effect=126.043 for offshore outsourcing vs. domestic outsourcing).  Experience in 
offshore outsourcing significantly increases firms’ preference to offshore outsourcing 
(Beta=3.457, p<0.01; odds effect=31.735 for offshore outsourcing vs. domestic 
insourcing and Beta=5.566, p<0.001; odds effect=261.402 for offshore outsourcing vs. 
domestic outsourcing). These findings echo practitioner’s observations that firms are 
attracted by the cost savings of offshore outsourcing, but lacking of offshore experience 
holds some of them back.  
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To give a visual interpretation of the results, we depict the impact of business 
process characteristics on the absolute probabilities of choosing each sourcing 
mechanism in Figure 5. The dots in the middle show the probabilities when all variable 
values are held at their means. The dots on the right and left depict the probabilities when 
a particular variable increases or decreases by one standard deviation respectively while 
other variables are still held at their means. Due to the complexity of the estimation 
function, derivative of a variable (marginal effect) is not as simple as the coefficients in 
linear regression, but a function of all coefficients and variables. Thus this probability 
analysis serves as a rough substitution for marginal effect analysis. As shown in Figure 5 
(a), the probability of offshore outsourcing is the highest when process modularity is 
lower. The trend of probability change for offshore outsourcing is consistent as well: the 
higher the modularity, the lower the probability. The probability of domestic outsourcing, 
however, is higher when process modularity is higher. Similarly for ITD, Figure 5 (b) 
presents the notable diversion of the probability of offshore outsourcing and domestic 
outsourcing as ITD reaches higher level. Higher ITD entails drop in probability of 
domestic outsourcing and rise in probability of offshore outsourcing, while lower ITD 
leads to rise in the former and drop in the latter. All these findings in absolute 
probabilities lend further support to H1a, H1b, H1c, H2a and H2b. The other two Figures 
(5c and 5d) depict the two TCE-related characteristics. Again the findings about the 
effect of human capital specificity on domestic outsourcing are consistent with the 
literature. Higher human capital specificity is associated with lower probability of 
domestic outsourcing. Figure 5d captures the diversion of probabilities of domestic 
insourcing and outsourcing. Higher intellectual capital specificity corresponds to higher 
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probability of domestic outsourcing and lower probability of domestic insourcing. The 
results may suggest that firms tend to go to large domestic vendors for their technological 
capabilities and managerial expertise when the process involves high level of specific 
technology and knowledge. 
We also perform a group of robustness checks for our model. First we empirically 
tested for the presence of a nested model whereby firm decides between insourcing and 
outsourcing first, and between domestic and offshore location next. However, the 
likelihood ratio test (χ2=3.224, df=2) cannot reject the null hypothesis that the model is 
not nested (Greene 2000, p869). Further, from an empirical point of view, one needs to 
consider a nested model if the model does not satisfy the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA). Hausman test indicates that our multinomial logit model satisfies the 
IIA assumption. Second, offshore insourcing cell has only 9 data points and we have 14 
variables in the model, there is a possibility that the coefficient estimates in [4a] may not 
be stable. To check the stability of those estimates, we lowered the number of 
explanatory variables from 14 to 6 for the offshore insource cell and retained the full 14 
predictors for the other three cells. This implies that the offshore insourcing choice will 
have a utility function with fewer variables, i.e., the K in equation (1) will change from 
14 to 6 for offshore insourcing choice, but it will remain 14 for the other choices. The 
probability structure specified in equation (2) stays the same. We used the LIMDEP 
statistical package to implement the unequal variable specification. The results are 
presented in column [4b] of Table 6. A comparison across [4a] and [4b] indicates that the 
parameter estimates are qualitatively the same for five of the six constructs. The only 
discrepancy is in the process modularity construct, which becomes significant in the 
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reduced variable model, a discrepancy which is in favor of our theoretical arguments. 
Thus, the results do not indicate any major threats to the validity of our findings due to 
the low sample size in offshore insourcing cell. As a further check, we deleted the 
offshore insourcing cell and assumed that there are only three sourcing mechanisms 
rather than four. The main finding of the study remained qualitatively the same. 
Furthermore, the validated IIA assumption increases our comfortable level that pair-
comparisons that do not involve offshore insourcing will not be affected much by the 
changes in offshore insourcing cell. Therefore we believe that the low sample size (N=9) 
in the offshore insource cell does not pose a threat to the validity of our theories and 
findings. Third, we explored some interaction effects in our model. The interaction of 
strategic criticality and process modularity, and the interaction of strategic criticality and 
IT detachability do not show any significant effects on the choice of sourcing mechanism. 
The results remain qualitatively the same after the inclusion of these interactions. Fourth, 
we repeated the analyses using a richer process classification scheme based on Porter’s 
value chain: (a) Supply chain & operations processes; (b) Human resource processes; (c) 
Financial & Accounting processes; (d) Marketing & Sales processes; (e) Service 
processes; and (f) Information systems processes. We defined (f) IT processes as the base 
case. All dummies capturing the non-IT process types in a, b, c, d, and e, are significant, 
indicating that there are significant differences in sourcing choices for IT and non-IT 
processes. Since the results are qualitatively the same, for parsimony, we use the simple 
classification scheme capturing IT versus non-IT processes. With these robustness checks 
of the model, we are confident that our empirical analysis is valid to support our 
arguments and conclusions. 
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7.2. RESULTS FOR THE CHOICE OF CONTRACT TYPES 
The results for the first stage linear regression are shown in Table 11. Consistent 
with Hypotheses 1 through 4, the business process characteristics have significant impact 
on perceived coordination and negotiation costs. The positive effect of human capital 
specificity ( ) and the negative effect of maturity 
( ) on perceived negotiation costs support H1 and H2. The two 
characteristics that are grounded in modular systems theory show significant impact on 
perceived coordination cost. Increases in modularity ( ) and IT 
detachability ( ) significantly reduce the level of perceived 
coordination costs. Thus H3 and H4 are supported as well. These findings indicate that 
the two types of costs in fact have different antecedents.  
The second stage ordered probit analyses are presented in Table 12 and the results 
of the selection function of the choice of sourcing mechanisms are shown in Table 12-
Appendix. Model 1 through Model 3 do not account for the selection bias of sourcing 
choices and Model 4 through Model 6 show the results after taking the bias into account. 
The difference within the two groups of models is about adding control variables. Model 
2 vs. Model 1 (similarly, Model 5 vs. Model 4) is to include two control variables: intent 
to save costs and intent to improve quality. Model 3(6) incorporates all control variables 
for firms’ intent. The estimation of Model 1 though Model 3 is ordinary ordered probit 
estimation. Model 4 through Model 6 deploy the two-stage selection bias model. To 
identify the model, we need to have at least one different variable in the selection 
function (Lee 1983). Thus we included two experience variables in the choice of sourcing 
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mechanisms model. For each model, we report the coefficient estimation and model fit 
statistics.  
All six models show consistently that coordination and negotiation costs have 
significant impact on the contract choice. The effect of coordination and negotiation costs 
shows without adding control variables and correction terms (Model 1), but the 
significant levels and magnitude of the impact increase as the model gets more specified. 
This indicates that we effectively control for relevant factors in contract choices. The full 
model is Model 6, which includes all control variables and correction terms for selection 
bias. The model shows good fit (χ2=16.222, McKelvey-Zaviona R2 =0.229). In 
comparison with other models, this model has better indicators of model fit and thus 
supports our model specification. The parameter estimation in each model roughly shows 
the direction of impact of each variable on the contract choice. When coordination costs 
increases, firms are more likely to select contract types that are associated with higher 
incentive and design completeness and less flexibility ( =-1.066, p<0.05). Negotiation 
costs, on the other hand, are positively associated with firms’ tendency to choose contract 
types that are associated higher flexibility and lower incentive ( =1.177, p<0.01).  Thus 
Hypotheses H5 and H6 are supported. Intercept 1 is the cut off value for the first type of 
contract (FP) and Intercept 2 is the difference between Intercept 1 and the next cut off 
value. The high significance of Intercept 2 (p<0.0001) shows that the two extreme 
contract types FP and T&M are fundamentally different from CP contracts. This result 
supports the theoretical arguments about the three types of contracts in the literature 
(Bajari and Tadelis 2001). 
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As we expected, both correction terms have significant effect on the contract 
choice in the full model and the coefficients have higher value and significance than the 
control model, indicating there is selection bias problem and the impact of the 
characteristics are biased downward. The negative association between the correction 
item for domestic outsourcing choice ( =-1.939, p<0.05) indicates that when firms 
decide to adopt domestic outsourcing, they tend to choose contracts that are with high-
powered incentive to save costs, not contracts that offers flexibility for renegotiation. The 
correction item for offshore outsourcing shows similar effect ( =-1.080, p<0.05). This is 
in line with the TCE foundation for contract choices. According to TCE, firms outsource 
when the benefits of outsourcing exceed the potential transaction costs (negotiation costs 
in our analysis). Thus that firms choose outsourcing implies that the transaction costs 
may be relatively low and thus the need for a flexible contract is lower relative to firms 
that choose domestic insourcing. Interestingly, the selection bias does not seem serious 
when we do not control for firms’ outsourcing intents. This means that firms’ strategic 
intents sometimes may override firms’ benefits & costs. There are also some interesting 
results in the control variables. The intent to reduce costs makes firms more likely to 
choose FP contracts ( =-2.039, p<0.05). This is consistent with the fact that FP contracts 
provide the highest incentive to reduce costs.  
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Chapter 8 Discussion, conclusion and future research 
8.1. THE CHOICE OF SOURCING MECHANISMS 
This part of study proposed that business process characteristics, especially 
organizational design characteristics, i.e. modularity and IT detachability of a business 
process impact the choice of sourcing mechanism for that process. There have been 
fundamental changes in organizational design and structure as firms more and more rely 
on IT infrastructure to coordinate and organize production (services) within and among 
them. Firms run as digitally enabled extended enterprises that disaggregate firm functions 
to a network of suppliers. We theoretically argued that in addition to TCE- and RVB-
related characteristics examined in the literature, modular design characteristics such as 
modularity and IT detachability may have significant impact on firms’ sourcing choice. 
We relied on modular systems theory and cost-based analysis of governance modes 
framework to explicate the impact of modular design characteristics on production, 
coordination and transaction costs, and as a result, the choice of sourcing mechanism. 
The empirical findings support the arguments and provide interesting and intriguing 
insights into the BPO phenomenon. 
Our research has important implications for research in firms’ governance choice. 
The results provide strong support that modular design characteristics are important for 
firms’ choice of sourcing mechanism. Conventional TCE-based research focuses on 
opportunism-based costs in a vendor-client relationship and the binary choice of 
insourcing vs. outsourcing. The innovations in technology and organizational design have 
fundamentally changed the coordination and organization of production/service in firms. 
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Processes have been reengineered to exploit the potential of IT and now mostly 
facilitated by IT (Davenport and Short 1990). Production/service can be encapsulated as 
modules and coordinated globally. Outsourcing evolves from market contract to a 
relationship requires constant information processing, exchange and communication. 
Opportunism-based characteristics may not completely capture the potential impact of a 
business process features on the sourcing choice. Our findings suggest that modular 
designs of processes and IT infrastructure can significantly impact firms’ sourcing choice 
even after controlling for TCE-based characteristics. The results suggest that the 
governance choice is not merely driven by the concerns potential risk of opportunism in 
the relationship, as suggested in the literature and that the considerations of the design 
feasibility of unbundling a process are salient in the decision making too. Tightly coupled 
processes and IT reduce firms flexibility to unbundle them and exploit for sourcing 
mechanisms that may have lower cost and higher capabilities. Given that the 
characteristics play important role in the choice of sourcing mechanism, they may 
influence other fundamental governance choices of the firms such as alliances, which 
could be interesting for future research. 
We examined in detail how of process modularity and ITD in firms’ sourcing 
decision with our typology of four types of sourcing mechanism. We find that at higher 
level of process modularity, domestic outsourcing is more likely while offshore 
outsourcing is more preferred at lower level of process modularity. The findings suggest 
that offshore and domestic outsourcing are different in governance features and match 
different modularity profiles of business processes. Modular processes make it easier for 
domestic vendors to provide standardized services and exploit economies of scale and 
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scope by pooling similar demand together. Also lower transaction and coordination costs 
make outsourcing more attractive to firms. When modularity is low, if the vendor wants 
to take advantage of standardized services, it may have to take the jobs of explicating the 
process, defining interfaces and clarifying performance requirements, etc. The 
consequent constant communication for adaptation between the vendor and the client is 
not quite in favor of domestic vendors’ business model. Together we establish that 
offshore vendors provide complementary modularization and adaptation services to less 
modular business processes while domestic vendors can make most out of modular 
business processes with their scale and expertise. The results highlight the important role 
of modular design of business processes to facilitate business process outsourcing and 
suggest offshore vendors may be viable choice for firms that are looking for capabilities 
and adaptation willingness to improve their modular design. 
The results for ITD show that ITD captures different features from process 
modularity. ITD is about the relationship between a single process and the integrated IT 
platform that serve all business processes. In most firms, the IT platform has being built 
and developed along the years. Upon centralized operation systems, databases and 
network infrastructure, there are business applications supporting various business 
processes of the firm. The design creates the feasibility problem when individual business 
processes are tightly coupled with the underlying central infrastructure even they are 
modular from each other. Our findings suggest that tight coupling of a process and IT 
infrastructure makes offshore outsourcing less favorable because it is not physically or 
economically feasible to transfer or replicate the IT infrastructure of the whole firm in 
order to run a single or several business processes. We also found that domestic vendors 
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may provide possible solutions for coupled IT and processes because they can take over 
the whole IT function along with the business process with their scale and expertise. For 
instance, P&G delegated its whole IT department together with other business processes, 
which meant millions of IT investment and thousands of employees, to HP. When a 
process is more independent from IT infrastructure, the result suggests that offshore 
outsourcing is more likely relative to domestic insourcing and outsourcing. Putting 
puzzles together, domestic outsourcing offers necessary complementary services (which 
may not be free) for outsourcing business processes highly coupled with IT infrastructure 
while offshore outsourcing becomes more attractive when it is easy to detach business 
processes from IT infrastructure. This implies that higher IT detachability bestows greater 
flexibility to select different sourcing mechanisms for maximum benefits. 
Our findings highlight the significance of IT detachability and echo the recent 
SOA trend in IS design. The SOA architecture promotes to substitute traditional 
centralized IT architecture with encapsulated “IT services” that can be plugged in/out or 
recombined to perform functions. SOA enables IT to be served as utility: when IT 
services are needed for a business process, the firm may turn related service-oriented IT 
components on, not involving the complete IT infrastructure. Thus there may be two 
approaches to increase detachability of business processes from IT infrastructure: one is 
to reduce the interdependence between processes and centralized legacy IT infrastructure 
and the other is to modularize IT infrastructure into individual service components that 
are ready to be recombined to support business processes.  Showing the strategic 
significance of IT detachability in choice of sourcing mechanisms, our study endorses the 
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necessity and importance of this new trend in IS industry for firms to move toward 
flexible, agile and responsive IT infrastructure design. 
We also examined the role of TCE-related characteristics in guiding the choice of 
sourcing mechanism. The results provide mixed information about the tendency to 
choose domestic outsourcing and offshore outsourcing. Consistent with previous work, 
firms tend to select domestic insourcing over domestic outsourcing when human capital 
specificity is high. Contrary to TCE prediction to outsourcing in general, firms are more 
likely to select offshore outsourcing over domestic outsourcing when human capital 
specificity is lower. This is intriguing because the cultural distance and lack of familiarity 
with offshore firms, economic and political environment of foreign countries intensify the 
potential risk of outsourcing (Erramilli and Rao 1993). It may be explained that offshore 
outsourcing is different from the general definition of outsourcing in TCE literature. TCE 
analysis is built on the underlying competitive assumption that both the clients and the 
vendors operate in the same marketplace and they do not have market power over each 
other. This assumption is often applicable to domestic vendors, but not offshore vendors. 
The vendor in developing economy is often willing to adapt and has not good bargaining 
power when uncertainties happen. This may explain the higher likelihood of offshore 
outsourcing over domestic outsourcing when human capital specificity is lower, but 
needs further empirical data and analysis to validate the propositions.   
Intellectual capital specificity decreases the likelihood of selecting offshore 
outsourcing over domestic outsourcing. Weak intellectual property regimes make it 
difficult to protect firm’s intellectual capital in offshore locations. Thus, when there is 
need to outsource processes that are high in intellectual capital specificity, firms prefer 
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domestic outsourcing. Factors such as geographic proximity, similar time zones, cultures, 
and languages, and strong intellectual property regimes, reduce the transaction costs 
entailed in using domestic outsourcing relative to offshore outsourcing. Second, when we 
compare likelihood of selecting domestic outsourcing over domestic insourcing, we find 
that firms are more likely to select domestic outsourcing when ICS is high. This finding 
seems to contradict TCE-based predictions about the role of ICS. Our data indicates that 
firms choose domestic outsourcing even for processes that are high in ICS. Further 
research will be required to understand why. A preliminary explanation could be that US 
firms seek to exploit superior process expertise of domestic outsourcing vendors, but at 
the same time, they are able to protect their IC through strong contacts and intellectual 
property regimes. This would not be possible in offshore markets due to weaker 
intellectual property regimes. 
Together, our findings establish the significance of modular design characteristics 
in determining firms’ choice of sourcing mechanisms. Also we have considered four 
sourcing mechanisms along two dimensions (ownership & location) in addition to the 
conventional binary choice between insourcing and outsourcing. The results lend 
credence to our classification of sourcing mechanisms. Overall the study has several 
ramifications. First it suggests that the choice of sourcing mechanism is not entirely 
dominated by TCE and RBV concerns. Modular organizational design is also important 
and plays a significant role in determining the choice of sourcing mechanism. While TCE 
and RBV emphasize the salience of characteristics that lead to opportunism and strategic 
risk, modular design arguments point to the factors that affect coordination costs and 
unbundling feasibility. We investigated the three set of factors simultaneously. We 
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empirically demonstrated the distinct role of modular design characteristics in guiding the 
choice of sourcing mechanism after controlling for other sets of factors. As the 
fundamental issue behind TCE and RVB theories is the question why firms are the way 
they are, the study can provoke examination of firm structure from modular design 
perspective. In addition to opportunism-based transaction costs and firm knowledge, 
modular design theory can serve as an important basis for why firms are the way they are. 
In fact, Baldwin and Clark (2006) proposed a theory of firm based on modular systems 
theory. They argue that modular structure of a network (of production/services) 
determines firm boundaries. Firms exist as individual modules to encapsulate complex 
transfers and transactions among firms happen at interfaces where information hiding is 
high and transfers are few and simple. Our conceptualization and operationalization of 
modular design characteristics can be extended to study their influence on the scale and 
scope of firms. 
Second, our explicit treatment of offshore outsourcing in comparison to domestic 
outsourcing suggests firms take a more comprehensive look at this new sourcing 
mechanism than merely cost-reduction alternative. The systematic evidence that the 
choice among four sourcing mechanisms is affected significantly and in theoretically 
predicted ways by business process characteristics supports our differentiation between 
offshore and domestic outsourcing. The distinction we made is not only theoretically 
relevant for studying the choice of governance mode, but provides operational guidelines 
for firms’ selection of sourcing mechanisms. Prior research argued that firms mainly 
choose offshore outsourcing to reduce costs (Dossani and Kenney 2003). We proved that 
firms have distinctive motivations to use offshore outsourcing instead of domestic 
 89
outsourcing. There is evidence that offshore vendors are delivering value added services 
more than cost-savings such as process modularization. As offshore outsourcing market 
is getting mature, it is critical for firms to consider it as a strategic alternative with 
distinctive governance features such as willingness to adapt, modularization capabilities 
and customization, etc. Also it is possible to extend the classification to include 
additional level of analysis for firms’ choice of governance mode. For instance, it may be 
interesting to look at how firms choose different contracts within each sourcing category 
for different business processes. 
Third, modular enterprise architecture may add significant value to firms 
operations and competitive advantages. Our study suggests that with well-defined 
modules and interfaces, firms achieve the strategic flexibility to adopt various sourcing 
mechanisms for maximum benefits. In extension of the thoughts, modular design 
provides firms options to configure and combine business processes to accommodate and 
adapt to organizational innovations and changing market conditions (Schilling and 
Steensma 2001). Capabilities that can be plugged in/out and sourced from around the 
world enable the firm to operate on the optimal basis of available resources with no 
geographic or organizational restrictions. Managers can focus on coordinating and 
orchestrating modules and leave adaptation details to individual modules. In today’s 
global economy, such flexible, agile and scalable organizational design is critical for 
firms to respond rapidly to changes in competitive environment. Moreover, the 
competitive advantage derived from the level of architectural design is difficult for 
competitors to imitate (Simon 1962). Replicating business practices of certain facets of a 
firm is relatively easy because operations and business goals are usually observable and 
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traceable. Architectural design of a firm, on the other hand, requires in-depth 
understanding of how the firm coordinates different business activities, information 
sharing and decision making. It is not easy for an outsider to gain similar understanding 
to the extent that complicated organizational knowledge, history and culture issues are 
involved in the evolution of organizational design. Thus the competitive advantage 
resulting from firms’ modular architecture is more likely to sustain than local 
innovations. Digitally enabled enterprises should grasp opportunities to build modular 
organizational architecture to achieve strategic flexibility, agility and sustainability in 
today’s globally connected economy. 
8.2. THE CHOICE OF CONTRACT TYPES 
This part of study examined firms’ contract choices for business process 
outsourcing. We proposed and empirically tested that business process characteristics 
affect coordination and negotiation costs and thus the contract choice. We considered 
three types of contracts: FP, CP and T&M, which are ordered in their levels of cost-
reduction incentive, contract completeness and flexibility to change. There is a trade-off 
between cost-reduction incentive and contract completeness and flexibility to change 
when choosing different contract types. Thus firms need to choose the appropriate type of 
contract by weighing one type of concern against another based on the characteristics of 
transactions. We focused on two major concerns: coordination and negotiation costs and 
found their differentiated impact on the contract choice. We sought to make contributions 
in the following aspects.  
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First we found both types of concerns in contracting: coordination costs generated 
from process interdependence and negotiation costs based on the risks of ex post 
adaptation between the client and the vendor to be important for the contract choice. 
While the literature on contract choices are dominated by concerns of opportunistic 
behavior of the vendor in situations such as information asymmetry, moral hazard, hold-
up problems and maladaptation, our findings suggest that considerations of managing 
task interdependence, e.g. the modular design of firms, in selecting outsourcing contracts 
are also salient. Our study is in line with Gulati and Singh’s (1998) findings on firms’ 
choice of governance structure for strategic alliances. They also confirmed that firms 
choose governance structure to cope with coordination concerns. Specifically, firms 
address the concern for negotiation costs by adopting contracts with more flexibility to 
change and lower-powered incentive to reduce ex post frictions with the vendor in 
uncertain situations. This is consistent with the literature. More interestingly, our findings 
suggest that firms tend to force high-powered incentive contracts (e.g. FP contracts) on 
processes with higher coordination costs, or less modular processes. This finding deviates 
from conventional the literature that proposes to use more hierarchical control and 
administration, which are features of T&M contracts, to alleviate coordination problems 
(Gulati and Singh 1998). By assuming that firms would like to seek external capabilities 
to modularize less modular processes first, we argued that the IT-enabled new 
modularization trend of organizational design may motivate firms to take advantage of 
FP features to facilitate modularization tasks. The vendor has the incentive to define and 
clarify the process to achieve complete detailed initial description of the process under FP 
contracts. This effort provides the client the chance to introduce new changes that may be 
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difficult to start internally. Also the fixed fee schedule motivates the vendor to seek for 
methods to minimize costs of communication and information sharing. This finding is 
consistent with the findings in Tanriverdi et al. (2007) that firms tend to outsource for the 
capabilities of modularization of the vendor. 
Second, our findings shed some lights on the origin of different types of costs 
incurring in outsourcing relationships. We found different characteristics display different 
significance on different types of costs. Modular design features: process modularity and 
IT detachability significantly impact coordination costs, but not negotiation costs. Process 
maturity, which implies the probability of exceptions and changes in operations of the 
process, is negatively associated with negotiation costs, but not significantly associated 
with coordination costs. In previous literature, due to the conceptual convenience of term 
transaction costs, all types of costs associated with outsourcing relationships are usually 
discussed under the vein of “transaction costs”. Considering that different types of costs 
are associated with different tendency to select contract types, there may be diverting 
impact of business characteristics on contract choices. Our explicit treatment of 
coordination and negotiation costs provides empirical support for the implicit model that 
establishes the direct link between transaction characteristics and governance choices. 
These findings also strengthen our study on the choice of sourcing mechanisms by 
verifying the impact of business process characteristics on coordination and transaction 
costs.  
Third, we identified the selection bias of the choice of sourcing mechanism on the 
choice of contract types. The contract choice needs to further address similar concerns 
that firms consider when they make the decision whether or not to outsource the process. 
 93
We can observe contract choices only when firms actually outsource. Thus the sample of 
contract choices is censored at the point that the concerns for outsourcing overweigh the 
benefits of outsourcing. As factors that affect the choice of sourcing mechanism will have 
impact on the contract choice, the estimation of the impact of the factors will be biased. 
Our results confirmed our concerns for selection bias and found that when controlled for 
selection bias, the factors exhibit larger impact on the choice of contract types. In 
addition, the results suggested that the firms that select outsourcing are also the firms that 
are more likely to select fixed-price contracts. The decision to outsource significantly 
increases firms’ preference to FP contracts, comparing to firms remain insourcing. This 
indicates that factors lead to firms to initiate outsourcing can be better addressed with FP 
contracts than T&M contracts. This is consistent with our findings in both choices. For 
instance, firms outsource less modular processes to address modularization problems and 
select FP contracts to further facilitate modularization contracts.   
Our results may also raise some interesting questions in practices. Popular 
practitioner’s research and consulting parties always promote complete well-structured 
Service Level Agreement (SLA) for every outsourcing deal. Our analysis suggests that 
when uncertainties and specificities are higher, firms should leave some flexibility to the 
contract for less costly renegotiation. SLA slates every performance requirement in strict 
numbers and expects the vendor to follow exactly. It may be suitable for mature, standard 
processes, but may incur considerable effort and hassles to renegotiate when there would 
be a lot of uncertainties and changes. So the firm may sacrifice cost savings and contract 
completeness to choose T&M contracts for the flexibility. Thus firms need to analyze the 
process in depth and incorporate expectations for uncertainties and changes when they 
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craft the contract. Second, we showed that less modular design characteristics lead to 
higher coordination costs and firms tend to select high-powered incentive contracts (e.g. 
fixed price) to address the high coordination costs. Conventional thinking has suggested 
high coordination costs lead firms to select contracts with low-powered incentives and 
more control and administration (e.g. time & materials). Our findings suggested that high 
coordination costs make firms to adopt high-powered incentive contracts to facilitate 
modularization of less modular processes. A high-powered incentive contract motivates 
the vendor to spend time understanding and documenting the process in detail, 
standardizing interfaces and minimizing communication costs. Firms are more actively 
seeking solutions for less modular processes by forcing modularization through the 
vendor with high-powered incentive contracts. This approach may provide firms with 
opportunities to keep hands off “the mess” of internal organizational changes 
accompanying modularization while achieve cost savings and evolution in organizational 
structures.  
In summary, our study systematically investigates the link between business 
process characteristics and the contract choice. Our findings suggest business 
characteristics are associated with different types of costs in outsourcing relationships 
and both types of costs are critical for firms to choose appropriate contract types.  The 
concerns of managing interdependence are better mitigated with high incentive contracts 
with detailed service descriptions such as FP contracts while the concerns of 
opportunistic behavior in ex post adaptation should increase the preference to contracts 
with more flexibility for changes such as T&M contracts.  
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8.3. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our research has its limitations and future research needs to address them. First, 
the study focused on the choice of sourcing mechanism and the choice of contract types 
and assumed firms’ rationality that analyzes benefits/costs based on process 
characteristics and makes optimal choices. Reported high failure rates of domestic and 
offshore outsourcing projects indicate that firms may not make completely rational 
decisions predicted by theories. If we have performance data, we could validate the 
choice function by looking at the performance implications of choice. If a decision is 
made on the rational choice of a sourcing mechanism that best fits characteristics of a 
given business process, it would minimize overall costs, and hence, positively influence 
the performance of the process. Evidence of positive performance implications of correct 
choice in turn strengthens our theory of choice. Thus there is a need to extend this study 
to include a second-stage performance analysis of sourcing choices.  
Second, we made an assumption that firms would like to modularize the process if 
the process is low in modularity. That is, firms always want to have modularization tasks 
done when they identify that the process is not modular. Though our analysis and results 
show consistency with the assumption, it would be ideal that we can have measurements 
to verify this assumption.  
Third, when characterizing sourcing mechanisms, we equal domestic outsourcing 
to large mature US vendors and offshore outsourcing to relatively small immature 
vendors in developing countries. Although our data validates such simplification, the 
generalization should be interpreted carefully. Our value proposition analysis of domestic 
and offshore vendors is based on this simplification. We made some assumptions for 
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vendors’ value proposition. Though our argument that domestic vendors exploit value 
from standardization and scale and offshore vendors are willing to adapt to firms 
requirements and offer modularization services are based on theoretical analysis and 
observed facts, it might be ideal that we can validate this assumption with empirical data. 
This requires a vendor side survey in addition to client perception.  
Fourth, our sample size (N=93) for the choice of sourcing mechanisms need to be 
improved to consistently estimate an MNL model with four-category dependent variable 
and a dozen of independent variables. Although we are confident in the validity of our 
results after a thorough list of robustness checks, it will never be more cautious to 
consider the limitation of sample size when generalizing the findings of a study. Also 
since this study is the first one to look at the impact of business process characteristics on 
the choice of sourcing mechanisms, our exploratory results need to be supported with 
rigorous future research with. In addition, the imbalance of offshore insourcing cases in 
our sample refrain us from developing and testing hypotheses related to this choice. We 
expect future research with larger sample sizes to address these limitations. 
Fifth, the sample for the choice of contract types raises some concerns as well. 
We combined the sample from two stages. Although test results showed no significant 
difference between the two stage samples, it would still be ideal that we achieved the 
sample at the same stage because BPO phenomenon keeps evolving over time. Also the 
percentage of missing data is not small because of variables coordination and negotiation 
costs have more missing values than other variables. The design the survey may account 
for the significant missing of the two variables. Thus there will still be much need for a 
more refined dataset to address these limitations. 
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Sixth, the measurement model of ITD needs improvement. We accepted the two-
item model based on less restrict criteria for new construct. Nevertheless, we recognize 
our limitation on the factor. Moreover, the rich theoretical implications of process 
modularity and ITD calls for conceptualization and validation of more comprehensive 
dimensionality of the two constructs. For instance, process modularity can have 
dimensions in information, people and resources. ITD can describe the detachability from 
hardware, software and communications perspectives. Future research can enrich the 
dimensions of the constructs and/or apply the constructs to broader questions of digitally 
enabled enterprises. 
Seventh, due to the limitations of MNL model itself, we cannot make any 
conclusive suggestions about absolute changes of probability to choose each sourcing 
mechanisms when business process characteristics change. The hypotheses have to be 
made about the impact of modular characteristics on the likelihoods of selecting one 
sourcing mechanism relative to another one. Although this does not affect the theoretical 
significance of modular characteristics, it may be difficult for firms to make direct 
inference to our research for decision among four sourcing mechanisms. Future research 
may explore 
Finally, the contract types have been simplified into three types in this study 
because the fundamental structures of most contracts are variants of the three types. 
However, contracts in real world are more complicated than this simple categorization. 
We derived the differences between the contracts mainly from the literature. Since BPO 
is a relatively new phenomenon, there might be new features have been introduced into 
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contracting. If possible, future research should study the micro features of a contract and 
analyze how these features address firms’ concerns of outsourcing. 
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Transaction Cost Transaction Characteristics 
Monteverde, K. and D. J. Teece (1982). "Supplier switching costs 
and vertical integration in automobile industry." Bell Journal of 
Economics 13(1): 206-213.
make or buy of automotive 
component Not measured
Engineering effort specific to 
the assembler
Walker, G. and D. Weber (1984). "A transaction cost approach to 
make-or-buy decisions." Administrative Science Quarterly 29: 373-
391.
make or buy of automotive 
component Not measured
Volume uncertainty, 
technological uncertainty,  
competition among suppliers
Pisano, G. P. (1990). "The R&D boundaries of the firm: an empirical 
analysis." Administrative Science Quarterly 35: 153-176. make or buy of R&D Not measured
number of suppliers, number of 
rivals
Anderson, E. (1985). "The salesperson as outside agent or 
employees: a transaction cost analysis." Marketing Science 4: 234-
254.
salesperson as outside 
agent or employee Not measured
Specificity of assets, difficulty 
of evaluating performance, 
environmental unpredictability, 
travel requirements
Anderson, E. and A. T. Coughlan (1987). "International market entry 
and expansion via independent or integrated channels of 
distribution." Journal of Marketing 51(1): 71-82.
make or buy of international 
distribution channels Not measured
Specificity of assets, Specificity 
of service requirements
Erramilli, M. K., and Rao, C. P. (1993). "Service Firm's Entry-Mode 
Choice: A Modified Transaction Cost Analysis Approach." Journal of 
Marketing 57: 19-38.
choice of entry mode of 
service firms: full control vs. 
shared control Not measured Asset specificity
Gulati, R. and H. Singh (1998). "The architecture of cooperation: 
managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic 
alliances." Administrative Science Quarterly 43: 781-814.
Alliance governance 
structure: contractual 
alliance, minority equity 
investment, joint venture Not measured
Appropriation concern - 
presence of a technology 
component
Gatignon, H., and Anderson, E. (1988). "The Multinational 
Corporation's Degree of Control Over Foreign Subsidaries: An 
Empirical Test of a Transaction Cost Explanation." Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization 4: 305-306.
Entry mode (4): minority 
share, equal share, majority 
ownership, wholly owned Not measured
Asset specificity - R&D 
intensity, advertising intensity; 
moderator - country risk
Kishore, R., M. Agrawal, et al. (2004). "Determinants of Sourcing 
During Technology Growth and Maturity: An Empirical Study of e-
Commerce Sourcing." Journal of Management Information Systems 
21(3): 47-82.
e-Commerce sourcing 
modes: hierarchical, hybrid, 
market Not measured Project complexity
Table 1 TCE-based papers and measurements
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Table 3: Constructs, measurement items and supporting literature for the choice of sourcing mechanisms 
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Table 4: Measurement Properties of constructs for the choice of sourcing mechanisms 
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Table 8: Construct definitions, measurement items and supporting literature for the choice of contract types 
 
 107
















Table 13: Results from the selection function – MNL model of the choice of sourcing mechanisms 
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Figure 1: Process Maturity 
 
Figure 2: Modular proceses coupled with IT infrastructure 
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Figure 3: Non-idiosyncractic IT infrastructure – processes transferrable among IT 
platforms 
 
Figure 4: Portable IT infrastructure: Service-Oriented Achitechture 
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